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1. Executive summary 
 
 
1.1. What Explains EU Citizen Attitudes on Cohesion Policy? 
Together with researchers in six other European countries
1
, we launched an EU-wide survey 
to investigate how citizens’ feel about cohesion policy in which 17,200 citizens in 15 
Eureopan countries were interviewed
2
.  In addition, people were asked a set of questions 
having to do with knowledge and experience with the EU’s regional policy, along with how 
much and how one identifies with Europe, political attitudes and perceptions of institution and 
the economy.  We found that less than one-half of all citizens (roughly 45%) have even heard 
of the policy itself, while roughly one-third claim they have ‘benefitted from some EU project 
in their area’.   
When looking at whether citizens like the idea in general of Cohesion policy, we see that EU 
citizens are lukewarm on the idea of Cohesion – just over half say that they ‘somewhat agree’ 
with continuing the policy, while just under 6 in 10 want their country to spend about ‘the 
same’ as it does now, as shown in Figure 1.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Two questions on citizens attitudes toward EU Cohesion policy 
 
Note: All respondents are given some priming background information about Cohesion policy, and then asked 
the following: In question 1, we ask “In your opinion, the EU should continue this policy, where wealthier 
countries contribute more, and poorer EU regions receive more funding.” 1. Strongly agree, 2. Agree, 3. 
Disagree, 4. Strongly disagree, 5. don’t know.  In question 2, we ask about preferences for one’s home country 
spending on Cohesion ‘In your opinion, compared with what it spends today, should (COUNTRY) contribute, 
more, about the same, or less to this EU policy? 1. More, 2. About the same, 3. Less’. Weighted responses shown 
                                                     
1
 http://www.perceiveproject.eu/about-the-project/  
2
 https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1680/1680300_2018_2_bauhr_charron.pdf  
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However, not all citizens view the policy in a positive light, while some appear very 
supportive. Our main two explanations for why citizens vary in their attitudes on support for 
EU economic integration have to do with ‘benchmarking’ (using attitudes about one’s home 
institutions and quality of government /corruption) and ‘identity’ (how strongly one identifies 
as European vis-à-vis one’s home country and how one conceives of ‘being European’).  
 
1.2 Benchmarking and Support for EU Economic Integration  
With respect to ‘benchmarking’, we focus on the perceptions of corruption that citizens hold 
for their home institutions (local and national) as well as for the EU.  We find that when 
accounting for perceptions of EU-level corruption, the more citizens’ perceive corruption in 
their national institutions, the more positive they tend to be toward Cohesion Policy. This 
findings reflects what some call the “compensation effect”, that is that while high perceptions 
of national corruption may undermine support for actions made by domestic governments 
(including redistribution), it in fact leads to greater support for EU integration.  In other 
words, perceptions of domestic corruption leads to more public support for Cohesion policy, 
for the simple reason that people who believe their tax money is being stolen by domestic 
politicians would rather have the funds handled by the European Union. 
 
Figure 2: Perceptions of Corruption and Support for EU Cohesion Policy 
 
Note: model 1 is a logit model and model 2 is an ordered logit model.  Control variables include gender, age, 
education, exclusive national identity, support for domestic redistribution, economic satisfaction, and support for 
EU skeptic party, along with the quality of institutions and amount of Structural Funds received at the regional 
level.  Country fixed effects and design weights included. 
 
1.3 Identity and Support for EU Economic Integration 
 5 
Second, we investigate how one’s identity affects one’s attitudes towards Cohesion policy.  
We look at identity in two dimensions. One, we measure the strength of one’s attachment to 
Europe (as well as one’s home country).  Two, we try to capture how people conceive of what 
‘being European’ is – does it mean we share a common religion (Christianity) or is it more of 
having a set of common civic institutions and symbols, such as a common market, flag, 
passport, etc?  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Types of Identity and Public Support for EU Cohesion Policy 
 
Note: figure shows marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals from two separate ordered logit models 
(country fixed effects and survey design weights included).  Dots to the right (left) of the ‘0’ line on the x-axis 
imply a positive (negative) effect.  Confidence intervals that do not overlap the ‘0’ line are significant at p<0.05 
or greater.  
 
On the question of ‘strength’ of identity, our results largely confirm what many previous 
studies about public support for EU integration have shown – that national attachment has a 
negative effect, while EU attachment increases support, all things being equal.  Yet what do 
people in fact mean when they say they are ‘attached to Europe’?  Our study tries to consider 
this by asking several questions about what is important for people when they think of what 
‘being European’ is.   We then construct a measure that subtracts a ‘civic’ identity with 
Europe from a more ‘religious’ identity with Europe.  The results in Figure 3 show that 
people with a relatively higher conception of Europe as religious rather than civic are less 
likely to support Cohesion policy and more likely to want their home country to invest less in 
the policy in general.  Our main take away from this is that how one conceives of Europe as a 
group matters for support for integration.   
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1.4 What about other factors? 
In addition to benchmarking and identity, we also looked at whether people were ‘rational’ in 
their preferences for EU Cohesion policy – meaning if they were ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ 
economically from the policy.  Such measures individual level factors as income, position in 
the labour market, and regional factors such as Structural funds received and the level of GDP 
per capita.  We find little evidence that these ‘rational’ factors play a systematic role in 
assessing support for Cohesion policy.  We do however find that perceptions of the economic 
and perception of one’s regional wealth in relation to others in the EU does affect support 
somewhat – perceiving a better home economic and that one’s region is relatively wealth 
increases support for Cohesion.   
 
1.5 Structure of the report 
 
The report contains three articles on the influence of Corruption/Quality of Government and 
European identities on public support for cohesion policy. These articles are stand-alone 
papers peer reviewed in academic journals, and could be read as such depending on the 
readers interests. In Chapter 2 and 4 we analyze our own PERCEIVE survey data (for a 
detailed description of this data see Bauhr and Charron2018. 
https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1680/1680300_2018_2_bauhr_charron.pdf). In Chapter 3 
we use European Elections Survey data merged with data on regional level quality of 
government. 
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2. The EU as a Savior and a Saint? Corruption and Public 
Support for Redistribution  
 
 
summary 
While the European Union is plagued by considerable social and economic inequality, not 
least in the wake of both the enlargement of the Union and the financial crises, we know 
surprisingly little about the sources of public support for redistribution and the EU:s most 
significant tool for reducing inequalities: Cohesion Policy. We suggest that, while identity, 
ideology and utilitarian concerns may motivate support for international redistribution, such 
support is highly contingent on perceptions of domestic corruption. Using unique and newly 
collected survey data, we show that perceptions of domestic corruption increase support for 
within-EU redistribution but only in contexts where the quality of government is low and 
public service delivery deficient. Perceptions of corruption have no such effect in contexts 
where the quality of government is high. We conclude that perceptions of domestic corruption 
will drive support for Cohesion Policy in contexts where the EU can be seen as both a 
potential savior and - relative to domestic government - a saint.  We discuss implications for 
further EU integration.  
 
  
Keywords: Cohesion policy, corruption, European Union, public opinion, redistribution  
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Introduction  
 
Since its inception, the European Union (EU) has been challenged by social and economic 
inequalities among its Member States (MS).  With the enlargement of the Union in 2004 and 
the financial crisis in 2008, these inequalities have only intensified (OECD 2017).  The EU’s 
key policy tool to combat these disparities is Cohesion Policy, whereby hundreds of 
thousands of development projects have received funding from the EU in order to ”reduce 
disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favored regions”3.  
While we observe near unanimity among Europe’s political elite that Cohesion Policy, which 
consistently makes up approximately one third of the EU’s annual budget - is necessary - 
some even argue that it may be the key to Europe’s survival (Merkel 2011). Yet, despite its 
prominence in the budget and among elites, we know surprisingly little about whether, and if 
so why, European citizens actually support such massive annual cross boarder transfers of 
resources.
4
  
 
This study investigates the determinants of public support for Cohesion Policy and a 
reduction of inequalities in Europe. We suggest that, while utilitarian, identity driven and 
ideological explanations all contribute towards explaining public support for redistribution 
within the EU, institutional benchmarking is key to understanding preferences for 
international redistribution. Building on recent work on the importance of institutions in 
explaining public support for redistribution (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln 2007; Beramendi & 
Anderson 2008; Bauhr and Charron 2018; Birchfield & Crepaz 1998;; Jæger 2013), we 
suggest that the influence of perceptions of corruption on public support for international 
redistribution is highly contingent on the performance of domestic institutions, and in 
particular their perceived relative performance compared to the EU.  
 
In particular, perceptions of corruption can be highly detrimental for support for international 
redistribution and Cohesion Policy if they are an expression of elite distrust or even anti-
establishment sentiments. In such cases, the EU is seen as just as unlikely to redistribute 
resources in a fair and efficient way, and may even be blamed for the low performance of 
domestic institutions (Kumlin 2009; Beaudonnet 2014). However, if perceived domestic 
                                                     
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/faq/#1  
4
 ttps://www.politico.eu/sponsored-content/cohesion-policy-is-not-just-about-money-its-about-europes-future/   
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/faq/  
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corruption is instead simply an expression of critique against the domestic regime, the relative 
performance of the EU should matter for citizens’ support for within-EU redistribution. 
 
We thereby seek to make several important contributions to the literature. First, while both 
utilitarian and identity driven explanations have proliferated in recent years, we know less 
about the influence of “cue taking and benchmarking” (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; de Vries 
2018) based on domestic institutional performance in explaining citizen preferences for EU 
policies. In particular, studies provide sometimes conflicting evidence about whether citizens 
simply translate their level of distrust or perceptions of corruption across a governance level 
(the ‘congruence´ hypothesis) or if citizens perceive that supranational institutions can 
compensate for deficient government institutions (the ‘compensation’ hypothesis).5 Our study 
suggests that conflicting results can partly be attributed to the fact that national heuristics - in 
this case perceptions of corruption - can express widely different sentiments in different 
contexts. Specifically, the extent to which dissatisfaction travels across the multilevel 
governance system depends on the nature of the dissatisfaction, and the nature of the 
dissatisfaction varies across contexts. Perceptions of corruption in high performing contexts 
are more likely to express antiestablishment sentiments and therefore travel across 
governance levels. In low performing countries, on the other hand, perceptions of corruption 
are more likely to express a critique against the current domestic regime, and the EU can be 
perceived as able to compensate for domestic deficiencies. In other words, this indicates that 
both perspectives hold true but that their relative explanatory power varies across contexts. 
More broadly, this also indicates that individual level determinants of support for European 
integration may not be consistent across contexts but contingent on the overall performance of 
domestic institutions.  Thus, while most studies to date assume that individual level 
determinants of support for European integration are similar across contexts, we suggest 
instead that the effects of individual level determinants do indeed vary across contexts.  
 
We furthermore contribute to the recent debate on the extent to which support for the EU 
should be seen as one-dimensional or more multifaceted and policy specific (see Boomgarden 
et al. 2011), by providing the first study that directly investigates public support for the 
Cohesion Policy, allowing for a comparative analysis of determinants of public support across 
policy areas. Expressing support for the Cohesion Policy and other forms of fiscal 
                                                     
5
 See Muñoz et al 2011: Kritznger 2003; Sánchez -Cuenca 2000 and Andersson 1998 
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redistribution within the EU may be different from expressing general support for EU 
integration, since these policies may require different levels and types of social solidarity 
across borders. 
Empirically, we introduce the most comprehensive survey of public support for Cohesion 
Policy to date, carried out by the authors. While there is an emerging literature on support for 
European economic integration (Bechtel et al. 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Daniele and 
Geys 2015; Bauhr and Charron 2018), none of these employ survey data that have focused 
directly on public attitudes regarding the EU’s main redistributive policy.  The data build on 
17,147 interviews in 15 EU Member States, a sample that represents over 85% of the EU 
population. Since Cohesion Policy is one of the largest budget items of the European Union
6
, 
and it is not without controversies (see Piattoni and Polvarari 2016), increased knowledge of 
the sources of public support (or scepticism) for Cohesion Policy may provide valuable 
insights for researchers and policy-makers. This study represents a first step toward this goal.  
 
Institutional benchmarking on public support for EU integration 
The scholarly work on public support (or skepticism) of European integration is significant in 
both size and scope. A recent review of  the literature suggest that studies on EU integration 
have focused on three different types of explanations - utilitarian, identity driven and 
benchmarking with reference to the domestic context  (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Despite 
growing attention to the determinants of public support for European integration, 
comparatively little attention has been directed to how national contexts shape people’s 
support for European integration (ibid).
7
 The notion of ‘benchmarking’ refers to how citizens 
use cues of their own domestic (or regional) institutions as a heuristic when assessing the EU 
and support for EU integration (de Vries 2018). This idea can be traced to Hoffmann (1966), 
who argued that notions of national legitimacy could be a potential obstacle to future 
European integration. 
 
We  know comparatively little about whether citizens actually compare levels of performance 
across contexts or if they simply use domestic institutions as cues to assess the trustworthiness 
or competence of supranational institutions. On the one hand, building on the work of 
                                                     
6
For a comparative perspective, the expenditures on cohesion policy during the 2014-2020 budget period equate 
to roughly 57bil Euros per year, which is just greater than the total public annual expenditure of Finland in 2013 
(OECD.stat) 
7
 Sometimes, divides are defined more in geographical or perhaps economic terms, where voters in the “North” 
oppose open borders and fiscal transfers more while voters in the “South” support them. 
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Andersson (1998) and others, studies suggest that citizens oftentimes have insufficient 
knowledge about EU policies and therefore base their assessment of the EU on perceptions of 
national level institutions. This means that patterns of trust or dissatisfaction are typically 
reproduced across the multilevel government system; citizens that are dissatisfied with their 
own domestic institutions are also often dissatisfied with international institutions, such as the 
EU.  This implies that negative evaluations of national institutions decrease support for the 
EU and its policies among citizens – what has been called the ‘congruence’ hypothesis 
(Muñoz et al. 2011) or the ‘equal assessment’ hypothesis (Kritzinger 2003). For instance, 
studies find that trust and other forms of positive (negative) evaluations of  national level 
institutions positively predicts trust in the EU parliament, attitudes about the EU and 
satisfaction with EU democracy (Muñoz et al. 2011; Rorscheider 2002; Armigeon and Ceka 
2014).
8
  
 
On the other hand, some have pointed to citizens more or less actively comparing the relative 
performance of institutions in a multilevel governance structure, which leads to very different 
predictions of the effect of dissatisfaction or perceived corruption in domestic institutions.  If 
citizens do indeed compare the performance of different institutions across levels, 
dissatisfaction with domestic institutions could lead to increased support for EU integration. 
This is sometimes referred to as the ‘compensation’ hypothesis (Muñoz et al. 2011) or 
‘different assessment’ hypothesis (Kritzinger 2003).  Kritzinger (2003) finds that individual 
assessments of one’s own nation state are negatively associated with support for EU 
integration in the EU’s four largest members, yet she finds mixed evidence with respect to the 
link between citizens’ assessments of national level economy and EU integration support.  
Furthermore, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) finds that people living in countries with higher levels 
of corruption tend to trust the EU more on average, a factor that the authors argue conditions 
national level trust.   
 
However, the vast majority of studies on public support for the EU do not focus directly on 
economic redistribution. Factors explaining general levels of support for or trust in the EU 
may be different from the factors explaining public support for specific policy transfers to the 
EU, such as intra EU financial assistance, bailouts or Cohesion Policy (Bauhr and Charron 
                                                     
8
 Others find less consistent patterns when comparing before and after the financial crisis (Obydenkova and 
Arpino 2017).   
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2018; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014). These policies often come with a more concrete price tag, 
and economic redistribution within the EU can be perceived to be fundamentally different 
from the market liberalization often associated with EU integration efforts (Kuhn and 
Stoeckel 2014). Support for redistributive policies may require a different level of or form of 
solidarity across borders.  Studies focusing directly on economic integration offer fruitful 
territory for more thoroughly testing ideas of compensation or congruence, as citizens are 
faced with more of a concrete choice of integration – whether they want their tax money 
going to Brussels or their own capitals.  Moreover, measuring preferences on more specific 
policies about which citizens might have less direct knowledge is well-suited for models of 
benchmarking.  
 
To gain a closer understanding of when and how institutional benchmarking matters for 
public support for international redistribution, we investigate the influence of perceptions of 
corruption across different levels of quality of government. Most studies on both national and 
international redistribution tend to study individual level determinants of support for 
redistribution at the aggregate level only, either within a single country (Bechtel et al. 2014) 
or across a range of donor countries (Paxton and Knack 2012 Chong and Gradstein 2008, 
Bauhr et al. 2013), assuming that perceptions of corruption have similar effects across 
contexts. Indeed, institutions that perform well according to international standards, expert 
coders, or average public perceptions may still be perceived as highly corrupt by groups of 
citizens within that polity. Perceptions of corruption may influence redistributive preferences 
very differently across different polities, especially in a multilevel governance structure such 
as that of the EU. This is an issue to which we turn next. 
 
How perceptions of corruption influence support for Cohesion Policy 
 
In this study, we seek to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding about how 
national benchmarking, via perceptions of corruption, influences support for redistribution 
within the EU. In particular, we suggest that it is important to distinguish between individual 
level perceptions of corruption and the overall quality of government in the context in which 
citizens find themselves, since the latter may determine the effect of the former. Specifically, 
by studying perceptions of corruption across varying contexts, we can better identify the 
sometimes widely different underlying sentiments that drive perceptions of corruption, and in 
particular whether citizens perceive that more EU integration will help or not.  
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Perceptions of corruption may potentially be one of the key determinants of public support for 
redistribution. Typically, countries with well performing and low corrupt government 
institutions redistribute more resources and exhibit lower levels of inequality. In particular, 
well-functioning government institutions may increase the supply of and demand for public 
goods, the willingness to pay taxes and social trust (i.e. Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007), all of which is conducive to greater government 
redistribution.  At the aggregate level, studies show that low levels of corruption are 
correlated with less economic inequality, since low corrupt institutions ensure better 
accountability and thereby that tax money benefits many as opposed to a few. At the 
individual level, perceptions of corruption have been shown to undermine the willingness to 
pay tax in part because high levels of corruption lead citizens to expect that resources will be 
wasted or used for personal enrichment rather than the public good (Bauhr and Charron 2018; 
Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Brautigam et al. 2008).    
 
However, it is important to distinguish between preferences for domestic redistribution 
(national level) and preferences for inter-EU redistribution (supranational level). The 
literature has suggested several plausible ways in which perceptions of domestic corruption 
may increase public support for within-EU redistribution. Citizens that perceive high levels of 
corruption in domestic institutions may express a higher support for EU policies as a symbolic 
protest against the national political situation (Kritzinger 2003). Alternatively, they may more 
rationally compare or assume that EU institutions are outperforming domestic ones and 
therefore express support for the EU, much in line with the compensation hypothesis. For 
example, if EU funds are indeed more closely monitored than domestic ones (Fazekas ant 
Toth 2017), perceptions of domestic corruption may increase support for EU-led economic 
redistribution.   
 
Furthermore, public support for long term and institutionalized redistributions in the EU, as is 
the case in Cohesion Policy, may be particularly supported by citizens that perceive high 
levels of corruption if the majority of them live in contexts with relatively low performing 
government institutions.  Citizens that perceive high levels of domestic corruption may, on 
average, assume that EU policies aimed at redistributing resources will improve their  access 
to public services, since policies are more likely to benefit highly corrupt regions. If 
perceptions of corruption undermine the willingness to invest in public goods more generally, 
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they may not necessarily undermine the willingness to support policies that stand to primarily 
benefit one’s home region, such as one that transfers some degree of policy-making authority 
to another level of government, or even an outside governing body. This forms our first 
hypothesis   
 
H1. Perceptions of domestic corruption increase support for Cohesion Policy 
 
However, a key concern is the extent to which perceptions of corruption have similar effects 
across contexts. Thus far, we have focused mainly on one end of the scale when it comes to 
benchmarking – those that reside in areas that perform relatively more poorly in the EU 
context.  Yet perceptions of corruption may express sentiments that vary in kind between 
segments of the population.  In other words, not all forms of dissatisfaction can be expected to 
lead to an increased public support for Cohesion Policy, either because citizens perceive that 
the EU is unlikely to improve government performance and the handling of government funds 
or because perceptions of corruption are simply transmitted across governance levels. 
 
 Citizens who perceive high levels of corruption in areas with comparatively well-functioning 
domestic institutions may not place their hopes on the EU. Instead, dissatisfaction in contexts 
with relatively well-functioning institutions may be primarily driven by a general distrust in 
elites, as expressed in the growing number of studies on the proliferation of “dissatisfied 
democrats” or “critical citizens” (e.g. Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999). The type of distrust in 
elites and dissatisfaction expressed in such contexts is likely to be a latent variable that 
correlates to lack of trust in all types of political institutions. Thus, these citizens are unlikely 
to support transferring more authority to the EU, which may make distrusting citizens 
perceive that power is even further removed from the hands of the ordinary citizen to the 
hands of an opaque technocracy with even more limited understanding of the demands of the 
public. Distrusting and dissatisfied citizens in contexts with well-functioning domestic 
institutions are therefore unlikely to see the EU and Cohesion Policy as a solution. 
 
Thus, we suggest that the extent to which perceptions of domestic corruption translate into 
support for EU-lead redistribution is contingent upon the quality of domestic institutions, 
which we argue serves as a proxy for the extent to which perceptions of corruption are in fact 
an expression of underlying distrust of all elites.  This leads to our second hypothesis. 
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H2. Perceptions of domestic corruption have a stronger (weaker) influence on support for 
EU-lead financial redistribution in countries with low (high) quality of government 
 
In sum, while perceptions of domestic corruption may on average contribute to drive support 
for Cohesion Policy, we expect the effect to vary across contexts. In particular, perceptions of 
corruption will increase support for Cohesion Policy in contexts where the European Union is 
seen to compensate for domestic institutional deficiencies and ensure that resources are 
handled more efficiently. Citizens that perceive high levels of corruption in generally well 
performing contexts are more likely to distrust all forms of elites, including EU ones. In the 
following, we investigate and attempt to disentangle the complex relationship between 
corruption and Cohesion Policy empirically, using newly collected data. 
 
Research design, data and methods 
To test the hypotheses, the authors fielded an original survey with the purpose of better 
understanding the micro and macro level dynamics that drive support (or the lack thereof) of 
EU regional polices.  The survey includes over 35 substantive questions as well as seven 
demographic and background questions to the respondent.  The fieldwork was conducted 
during the summer of 2017.  In all, 17,147 interviews were carried out in 15 EU Member 
States.  While budget limitations prohibited the inclusion of all countries, these 15 countries 
in this sample represent over 85% of the proportion of the EU population.  Countries were 
selected on the bases of variation with respect to geography, size, and institutional quality (see 
appendix for more information).   
 
Measuring public support for Cohesion Policy is not as straightforward as in other policy 
areas, such as support for the Euro, which can be asked more or less directly.  Previous 
Eurobarometer surveys of ‘Awareness of Regional Policy in the EU’ show a relatively 
consistent and low level of awareness throughout the EU over the past eight years in which 
the question was asked to the public.  The latest four rounds of this Eurobarometer reported 
remarkably consistent results, with just over one third of respondents having heard of the 
policy
9
.   
 
                                                     
9
 The question was framed in each Eurobarometer survey: ”Europe provides financial support to regions and 
cities.  Have you heard about and EU co-financed projects to improve the area where you live?” In addition, the 
survey specified certain names, such as ‘regional policy’ and ‘structural funds’. In each case we observe that less 
than half of the respondents answer ‘have heard’.   
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Given this relatively low level of knowledge of the policy in general, a direct question on this 
topic would most likely lead to invalid results.  Respondents were therefore given some brief 
and basic background information about the policy in question:  
‘As you might have heard, EU Cohesion Policy aims to reduce regional differences within the 
EU in things like economic development, and employment.  While all members contribute and 
receive some funds, the wealthier EU countries generally contribute more and poorer EU 
regions receive more funding on average.’ 
 
Respondents were then asked the question of policy support, whereby we repeated the 
multilevel governance and redistributive for emphasis.    “In your opinion, the EU should 
continue this policy, where wealthier countries contribute more, and poorer EU regions 
receive more funding.” Respondents answered on a 4-point scale – strongly agree, agree, 
disagree and strongly disagree.  The weighted sample averages for the responses were 27%, 
52%, 15% and 5%, respectively, with less than 1% choosing ‘don’t know’.   In addition to 
asking about support of the general idea behind Cohesion Policy, following the work of 
Bechtel et al. (2014), respondents were asked a question that attempted to capture the 
‘intensity’ of their support – e.g. would they want their country (e.g. their own tax money) to 
contribute more or less of the same to this policy.  
In your opinion, compared with what it spends today, should (COUNTRY) contribute, more, 
about the same, or less to this EU policy? 1. More, 2. About the same, 3. Less 
 
In this case, the weighted sample averages are 18%, 59% and 24%, respectively.  We find that 
respondents from The Netherlands and France are least supportive, while those in Slovakia, 
Romania and Spain are most supportive.  In testing our hypotheses about compensation based 
on corruption perceptions, we employ both the support and intensity questions (see appendix 
table A3 for summary table of dependent variables by country).  
 
Our main independent variables are measures of corruption and institutional quality.  On the 
individual level, we measure the extent to which the respondents perceive corruption in their 
own national governing institutions as well as those of the EU via the following question: 
‘On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being that ‘there is no corruption’ and ‘10’ being that corruption is 
widespread, how would you rate the following institutions?’  
 
 On the macro side, we elect to measure institutions at the sub-national level rather than 
national as regional Cohesion Policy beneficiaries can differ dramatically within countries 
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such as Italy, Spain or the UK, for example. Further, several studies have shown that the 
quality of institutions not only varies significantly across EU countries, but within them as 
well at the regional level (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2015). Thus, based on our 
expectations, we should observe a significant amount of variation in support within countries 
– with support being higher (lower) in better (poorer) functioning regions; thus, the sub-
national level provides a stronger case for our theory
10
. We proxy institutional quality with 
the 2013 version of the ‘European Quality of Government Index (EQI, Charron et al. 2015), 
which to date is the best available proxy for the level of impartiality and corruption in 
regional public institutions.  To test our hypothesis properly – that individual perceptions of 
national corruption are conditioned by context - we create a multi-level interaction with the 
two types of corruption perceptions with the regional measure of the EQI.    
 
We control for several potential confounding factors highlighted in the literature on EU 
integration and financial aid support in Europe.  First, many studies point to the importance of 
university education (Hakhverdian et al. 2013); a dummy variable is included if the 
respondent has a tertiary education or higher.    Next, respondents were asked to place their 
attachment to three levels of governance – regional, national and European – on a 0-10 scale.  
Respondents who ranked their country highest are coded ‘1’ for national identity to account 
for this negative predictor (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2014).  We anticipate that 
supporters of EU skeptic parties will be least likely to support the idea of Cohesion Policy as 
well as of sending more of their tax money to other EU regions (Stoeckel and Kuhn 2017).  
Using party affiliation with various party groups at the EU level, we code a respondent’s party 
preference as ‘EU skeptic’ if they would vote for a party belonging to the openly Eurosceptic 
‘Europe of Nations and Freedom Group’ (ENF), ‘Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy 
Group’ (EFDD), or the ‘European Conservatives and Reformists Group’ (ECR). 
 
As per political values, we combine two questions in the survey to account for the ‘gal-tan’ 
dimension
11, as respondents with higher ‘tan’ values have found to be both less supportive of 
EU integration and more prone to rating corruption in their institutions as higher (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009).  We control for left-right ideology and preferences for domestic redistribution 
                                                     
10
 Regions here equate to NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 depending on the country.  Countries with data for NUTS 1 are 
Germany, UK, Sweden, Hungary, Belgium and Greece, and NUTS 2 level for all others.   
11
 The specific question formulations are found in the appendix.   
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via a question on the extent to which respondent’s feel their own government should ‘take 
measures to reduce income levels’ in their country (0-10).    
 
As utilitarian models suggest, the extent to which one supports a redistributive-type policy 
such as Cohesion Policy depends somewhat in part on one’s perception of one’s own regional 
status (Balcells et al. 2015).  Thus, prior to the two main questions, respondents were asked to 
place their region within four groups in terms of GDP per head – the wealthiest 25% of EU 
regions, to the poorest 25% of EU regions.  We also include the level of economic satisfaction 
of each respondent (1-4, -‘very dissatisfied’ to ‘very satisfied’).  Further, there is evidence 
that higher levels of inter-EU fiscal transfers to regions are associated with higher levels of 
support for EU integration (Chalmers and Dellmuth 2015).  We include the amount of per 
capita structural funds for the 2007-2013 budget period (logged), which accounts for the duel 
confounding effect of level of economic development - the poorest 25% of regions receive by 
far the largest proportion of Cohesion Policy transfers, while the wealthiest 50% receive quite 
little comparatively – along with possible ‘good will’ created by EU investments that might 
explain higher support in Cohesion Policy in recipient regions where institutional quality may 
also be lower on average
12
.  This measure also accounts for valuable within-country variation, 
as some countries (Italy and Spain, for example) have both ‘less developed’ and ‘more 
developed’ regions.   
 
We include standard controls for age and gender.  As there are undoubtedly country level 
factors that determine some of the variation among individuals that we cannot account for, we 
include country level fixed effects, as using a random effects model with only 15 top level 
observations can be suspect (Stegmuller 2013).  However, we check for the three level 
hierarchical specifications.  Finally, all individual level variables are standardized via a min-
max scale of 0-1 for purposes of comparability.  
 
Estimation and Results 
We begin by looking at the relationship between corruption perceptions, regional intuitional 
quality and preferences for Cohesion Policy without additional control variables, accounting 
only for country fixed effects and survey weights in eight separate models, summarized in 
                                                     
12
 Data are from: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/data-for-research/  
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Figure 1 (for the table output, see appendix Table A10).  As the dependent variables are non-
binary and ordered in nature, we estimate the models via ordered logit.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Testing H1 and H2 - Ordered Logit Estimates 
 
Note: Ordered logit estimates where dots are average marginal effect on the probability of the DV with 95% confidence 
intervals.   Grey diamonds show baseline models, black circles are effects with full controls.  Constant and country fixed 
effects included in all models, not shown.  Survey design weights included. Number of observations in support models is 
16,905, and 17,125 in intensity models. 
 
 
In the baseline models in columns 1 and 3, we find a strongly negative association between 
national corruption perceptions and support for Cohesion Policy, which runs counter to our 
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expectation in H1.  Yet this estimate is biased due to the omitted variable that is included in 
model 2 - perceptions of corruption of the EU; this gives us a finding similar to that of 
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000: 164) and Rohrschneider (2002).  Holding constant perceptions of the 
EU, we observe support for the idea of national level compensation, which is a consistent 
result across the models.  The effect of national level corruption perceptions is negative on 
support and intensity for Cohesion Policy absent from perceptions of EU corruption (baseline 
models, grey diamonds).  Including all control variables, we observe that the effect of national 
level corruption perceptions on support for EU economic integration becomes positive and 
significant for spending, yet negligible for overall support.   
 
The effects of the variables from the interaction models (H2) with and without control 
variables are shown in columns 2 and 4.  We find that the effects reported in Table 2 are 
robust to the inclusion of the controls.  Moreover, just after the gal-tan index, the measure of 
corruption perceptions explains the greatest total variation of the outcomes in the model
13
. 
Holding constant perceptions of EU corruption, national level perceptions of corruption have 
a positive effect on support for Cohesion Policy, yet are offset when quality of regional 
governance is higher.  Perceptions of corruption regarding the EU work in the opposite 
direction – an increase in the perception of corruption in the EU results in a decrease in the 
probability of supporting Cohesion Policy, and this effect is not offset by institutional quality 
at the regional level.  We find similar results for the outcome of ‘intensity’ with respect to the 
interaction effects.   
 
The control variables in the models are mainly in the expected direction. Having a university 
education or above is consistently associated with higher levels of support for Cohesion 
Policy but is negligible in terms of intensity.  Respondents who identify the strongest with 
their home country (in Europe or their region) are significantly less likely to support Cohesion 
Policy, similar to previous studies of EU economic governance and EU economic transfers 
during crises (Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Bauhr and Charron 2018).  Respondents who feel that 
their country’s government should reduce income disparities among individuals are also more 
likely support the idea of inter-EU redistribution.  Yet the gal-tan dimension has a greater 
marginal effect on the outcome variables, in particular with respect to intensity, which is 
                                                     
13
 We ran OLS models for each variable with country fixed effects and compared the 𝑅2, finding that the 
perceptions have the second greatest impact.  For the results of the main variables and model fit, see Tables A8 
and A9 in the appendix.  
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consistent with the findings of Hooghe et al. (2002). We also see that, on average, 
respondents who support Eurosceptic parties are less likely to express broad support for 
Cohesion Policy, as found in previous studies (Stoeckel and Kuhn 2017).  Finally, similar to 
Bechtel et al. (2014), we see that those who are more optimistic about the economic situation 
in their area are more prone to support inter-EU redistribution.  In addition, people who place 
themselves in the wealthiest regions being most likely to support Cohesion Policy, in contrast 
to utilitarian expectations.  We observe that citizens living in regions that have received more 
structural funds are slightly more supportive, a finding that is similar to Chalmers and 
Dellmuth (2015).  Finally, age is negligible and, while we find some evidence of a gender gap 
in support, with females being less supportive on average, there is no gender distinction in 
intensity. 
 
Figure 2: Average Marginal Effect of National Corruption Perceptions on Support and 
Intensity 
 
Note: figures visualize the interaction effects from the ‘support’ and ‘intensity’ models from Figure 1, including full control 
variables.  For parsimony, the marginal effects of national corruption perceptions are shown for the most extreme outcomes 
of ‘strongly agree’ (black line) and ‘strongly disagree’ (dotted line) and’spend more (dotted line) and ‘spend less’ (black 
line).  The right side of the y-axis shows the marginal effect, while the left side of the y-axis shows the % of cases for the 
mediating variable, the EQI.  95% confidence interval is shown around the estimate (the line). 
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Figure 2 shows a visual of the effect of national corruption perceptions, including a histogram 
showing the distribution of the EQI for support for Cohesion Policy.  To simplify, we show 
the marginal effects of national corruption perceptions on ‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly 
disagree’ on the left-hand side (support), and ‘spend more’ and  spend’ less on the right side 
(intensity). 
The overall message is clear.  The average marginal effect of national corruption perceptions 
increases the probability of support and intensity, yet only for citizens living in areas with 
lower levels of governance. For support, the effect becomes negligible at just below the value 
of ‘0’ in the EQI (e.g. the EU mean value), while intensity the effect is negligible just above 
the EQI mean.  Moreover, the model even predicts at the highest levels of institutional 
quality, that higher national level corruption slightly decreases support.   
 
Further tests and robustness checks  
We first check the underlying assumption of the second hypothesis – that citizens in relatively 
poorly governed areas in the EU evaluate the EU as less corrupt than their national level 
institutions, and vice versa in better governed areas.  We subtract the perception of EU 
institutions from the national institutions, such that positive (negative) values indicate that a 
respondent rated the national (EU) level as more corrupt, while ‘0’ indicates that they are 
rated as equally corrupt.  We then run a hierarchical model with this as the dependent variable 
testing whether variation in perception gaps can be explained by the EQI.  Figure 3 
summarizes the results and confirms our assumption – that perceptions of national level 
corruption are in fact systematically higher than EU ones in areas with the poorest levels of 
governance in the EU.  Conversely, the difference becomes negligible around the mean level 
of the EQI, and, for people living in the best-governed areas of the EU, the EU is perceived as 
slightly more corrupt than national institutions, on average.  The results therefore confirm our 
assumption and help us better understand why higher national level corruption perceptions 
increase support for EU economic integration in some areas, but do not do so in other areas.  
Full results are found in Table A4.  
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Figure 3: Predicted Difference in National and EU Perceptions of Corruption and the 
EQI – Multilevel Estimates 
 
Note: black line shows the predicted difference in national and EU perceptions of corruption from the fixed effect part of the 
model, ranging from -1 to 1 as a function of the EQI.  ‘1’ (‘-1’) implies that the national (EU) level is rated as completely 
corrupt while the EU (national) level is seen as completely clean.  ‘0’ implies that the institutions are rated equally on 
average.  95% confidence interval shown via dashed lines.  Histogram of the distribution of the EQI is included.  All control 
variables from Figure 1 included (see Table A5 for full results). 
 
Next, we check the robustness of our measure of regional institutions.  Fazekas and Kocsis 
(2017) provide an objective measure of high-level corruption risk in public procurement, 
which is available in most of our regions. When re-running our results with this measure, we 
find strong supporting evidence for H2 and the cross-level interaction effect (Table A5).   
 
Third, some research suggests that assessments of national governments are affected by 
foreign aid (Winters et al 2018), or that Cohesion Policy could lead to increased EU identity 
(Boaz et al 2018), thus there could be issues of endogeneity.  We check whether the 
relationship between national corruption perceptions and support for Cohesion Policy are 
spurious to ‘having heard’ of Cohesion Policy, ‘having benefitted from any EU project’, 
neither of which alters the results. Moreover, we check whether a respondent’s support (or 
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oppose) the current government
14
.  For example, citizens may be more tolerant to corruption 
in governments that they support or benefit from (Anduiza et al. 2013; Bauhr and Charron 
2017).  We re-run tests of H1 and H2 including a binary variable where 1 denotes support for 
a sitting government party as well a three-way interaction test  to see if our findings are driven 
by government or opposition supporters. In Tables A6 and A7 we find our results hold to this 
alternative.  
 
Fourth, we re-run the main tables using a logit estimation, whereby the support outcome is 
collapsed into a binary choice; the results are shown in Figures A1 and A2.  On intensity, we 
test the effects of preferring to ‘spend more’ as a binary outcome in relation to the other two 
choices.  We find consistent evidence of H2 in these models as well.  
 
Fifth, we test whether influential outliers are driving our results via a bootstrapping method, 
which employs simple random sampling with replacement.  Using the three-level hierarchical 
estimation, we specify the regional level as the one of primary interest and run 150 replicates 
of our original model in Table 1 (Figure A3).  We find these results also to be robust.   
 
Conclusion 
This article is to our knowledge the first comparative regional level study that investigates the 
determinants of public support for the EU’s central redistributive tool: Cohesion Policy.  Our 
results show that a majority of citizens profess some level of support for the idea of 
redistribution within the EU, indicating some level of legitimacy for inter-EU redistribution. 
We also show that support varies across segments of the population. While identity, ideology 
and economic factors influence support for within-EU redistribution, support is highly 
contingent on perceptions of domestic corruption. On average, perceptions of domestic 
corruption increase support for Cohesion Policy. However, the effect is primarily driven by 
citizens living in areas with dysfunctional or relatively low performing domestic institutions. 
Thus, much in line with the compensation hypothesis, these results suggest that citizens that 
perceive their government as corrupt prefer their tax money to be channeled through the EU. 
In these areas, citizens are more likely to perceive the EU as both a potential “savior and 
saint”, that will ultimately ensure better public service delivery and governance systems less 
plagued by corruption and mismanagement of public funds. However, perceptions of 
                                                     
14
 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer at JEPP for raising this point.  
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corruption in contexts with relatively well performing institutions undermine support for 
inter-EU redistribution, much in line with the congruence hypothesis (Andersson 1998; 
Muñoz et al. 2011).  Further, when we test the assumption directly, we in fact find that the 
gap in corruption perceptions between national and EU institutions varies systemically as a 
function of the quality of one’s home institutions. In contexts where the overall quality of 
government is low, citizens perceive EU institutions as less corrupt than domestic institutions. 
 
This study thereby adds to the limited number of studies that seek to investigate the effects of 
corruption on international redistribution. Despite increasing attention to the importance of 
institutions in explaining demand for redistribution, whether these are welfare state regimes, 
corporatism, and party and electoral systems (Beramendi & Anderson 2008; Birchfield & 
Crepaz 1998; Jæger 2013), the role of corruption and institutional quality has received 
surprisingly little scholarly attention, particularly in studies focusing on public demand for 
redistribution within the EU. Studies also reach somewhat conflicting results. Our study 
shows that the influence of individual level perceptions of corruption on support for Cohesion 
Policy is highly contingent on the quality of domestic institutions. Perceptions of corruption 
can have very different implications in low and high QoG contexts, with implications for 
redistributive preferences.  Thus, while most research to date studies individual level 
determinants of European integration as average effects, implicitly assuming that they have an 
equal explanatory power through similar mechanisms, our study suggests that effects and 
mechanisms differ between contexts. Thus, studying only average effects risks limiting our 
opportunity to understand the determinants of public support for integration and international 
redistributions.  
 
We also introduce what we believe is the most comprehensive citizen survey to date on 
Cohesion Policy. While there is an impressive literature on, inter alia, history, evolution, and 
and rationale behind EU Cohesion Policy on the one hand (Bachtler and Wren 2006; Piattoni 
and Polverari 2016) and public support for European integration (Ingelhart 1977; Gabel and 
Palmer 1995; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt and de Vries 2016) on the other, we know 
surprisingly little about public perceptions of and support for Cohesion Policy, despite this 
policy being the second largest budget item in the EU and most significant redistributive 
policy tool.  This analysis has sought to fill this gap.  
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While demand for redistribution is perhaps the strongest driver of policy and politics, income 
and capacities remain unequal in Europe. Perceptions of domestic corruption may increase 
support for Cohesion Policy, provided that the EU is seen as less corrupt. If support for 
cohesion is partly driven by perceptions of corruption in regions with dysfunctional domestic 
institutions, in particular in lower QoG areas, this has important implications for available 
avenues of securing public support for cohesion.   
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3. Why Support International Redistribution? 
Corruption and Public Support for Aid in the Eurozone 
 
 
 
summary 
What factors explain public support for international redistribution? While the European Union has sent billions 
of taxpayers’ money to over indebted euro countries in an attempt to avoid an economic collapse, these transfers 
have encountered fierce resistance among both donor and recipient constituents. However, we know surprisingly 
little about why citizens support or oppose redistribution within the EU. This paper suggests that domestic levels 
of corruption and institutional quality may be one of the most important explanations for the great variation in 
public support for financial assistance, bailouts and aid. Using recent European Elections Survey data merged 
with data on regional level quality of government, we show that the effects of institutional quality are 
consistently stronger than macro-economic factors, including economic development, inequality or levels of 
public debt. We find strong evidence that citizens in low corrupt contexts are more likely to support financial 
assistance to fellow member states. The results have implications for future challenges in securing public support 
for EU economic integration as well as for our understanding of how and why corruption undermines society’s 
collective action capacity. 
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Introduction 
In 2009, the European financial system was hit by one of the worst debt crises of our time – 
the Eurozone crisis. The financial bailouts after the 2009 economic crises represent one of the 
most massive cross border transfers of resources in recent times, and billions of taxpayers’ 
money was sent to over indebted Euro countries.
15
 While several experts view these bailout 
funds as necessary to avoid economic collapse, this redistribution of wealth has encountered 
fierce resistance among wide sections of the European public and many EU citizens strongly 
oppose the use of their tax-money to help other EU member states in times of crisis. Despite 
an impressive body of scholarly work on the determinants of support for domestic 
redistribution (e.g. Svallfors 2007; Jaegers 2006) and an emerging body of literature on public 
support for international redistribution and foreign aid (Milner and Tingley 2013: Bauhr, et al. 
2013; Paxton and Knack 2012), we know surprisingly little about the factors that explain 
public support for inter-state redistribution within the EU.  
This paper investigates the explanatory power of three major types of explanations for support 
for redistribution:  macro-economic, political/institutional and individual level explanations. 
Traditionally, economic variables and in particular macro-economic (or ‘sociotropic’) 
performance has been seen as one of the most central explanatory factors for public support 
for financial assistance. However, we suggest that these studies have largely overlooked the 
importance of the performance of government institutions and in particular their level of 
impartiality and corruption. This paper suggests that the quality of government institutions 
and levels of corruption, may be one of the most important explanations for variations in 
public support for financial assistance to other EU countries.  Citizens living in countries with 
well working domestic institutions support international redistribution to larger extent than 
citizens of countries with dysfunctional domestic institutions, and the explanatory power of 
the quality of institutions may be more important than macro-economic explanations, such as 
GDP/capita, income inequality or the level of sovereign debt.  
We posit that two separate but highly interrelated factors explain why domestic institutions 
influence support for inter-EU redistribution. First of all, as suggested by a growing literature 
in such varying fields as health policy, environmental policy or the stability of public 
finances, the quality of domestic institutions are important for the supply of public goods, 
with implications for citizens’ trust in the government’s ability to collect taxes and produce 
and provide such goods (Rothstein et al.2012; Svallfors 2013). Citizens living in countries 
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 The European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, for example, expected loans of up to 46.8 billion Euros to 
be distributed to Portugal and Ireland over three years (2011-2014) and 7.16 billion Euros in short-term 
assistance to Greece in 2015 (European Commission 2012) 
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with dysfunctional government institutions would thereby have experience of money being 
siphoned off from the provision of public services to the pockets of government officials, and 
therefore fundamental distrust the redistributive capacity of governments, domestically as 
well as internationally. Furthermore, the quality of government and level of corruption 
influence the demand for public goods provision. Clientelist and corrupt systems increase 
demand for particularistic payoffs rather than public goods and programmatic policies 
(Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2012: Kitchelt and Wilkinson 2007), and by implication, support 
for contributions to collective goods.  In short, corruption undermines societies’ collective 
action capacity and this lack of capacity, we suggest, extends across the border. 
This article thereby seeks to make several important contributions. It provides a theoretical 
contribution by helping to extend scholarly knowledge on what factors explain public 
willingness to support redistribution and help other countries in crisis, and in particular on 
why and how the level of corruption of donor institutions impacts support for financial 
assistance. While there is a large body of work on support for EU integration and specific EU 
policies (Hobolt and de Vries 2016), as well as a few studies that seek to understand public 
support for bailouts and the support for redistribution in the EU (see i.e. Bechtel et al 2014; 
Daniele and Geys 2015), this is to our knowledge the first comparative study that seeks to 
investigate the impact of corruption and domestic institutional quality on public support for 
financial assistance within the EU.  
We use recent survey data from the European Election Studies (EES), which contain data 
from all EU 28 countries. We find that public support for international financial assistance is 
significantly higher in regions with better institutional quality, and that the association 
between domestic levels of quality of government and support for helping other EU countries 
in times of crises is just over three times greater than the effect of economic development.  
Our analysis suggest that the quality of government institutions does not influence the extent 
to which citizens perceive that there is a collective problem to be solved in the first place, or 
sense of belonging to the EU, but rather that corruption undermines societies’ collective 
action capacity. Corruption undermines citizens’ trust in government’s redistributive capacity, 
as evident in a reduced willingness to pay taxes and levels of trust in domestic government 
institutions. In other words, corruption does not seem to undermine citizens’ perceptions of 
the problem being a collective one in the first place, but rather beliefs in the capacity of 
government institutions to tackle these problems. Thus, much in line with a “congruence” 
hypothesis (Muñoz et al 2011; Kristinger 2003; Andersson 1998), citizens’ use “cues” about 
domestic government performance to form opinions about the likelihood that international aid 
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and financial assistance will reach desired ends. In highly corrupt contexts, however, trust in 
EU institutions may to a certain extent compensate for the lack of trust in domestic 
institutions (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000), and increase support for sending financial assistance to 
other member states, suggesting that the performance of donor institutions, both domestic and 
international, are of central importance to harness a stronger support for financial assistance 
and aid to other countries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section one provides an overview of the 
literature on redistribution, aid, and corruption. Section two discusses the relationship 
between the quality of government institutions and support for international financial 
assistance and aid and develops our hypothesis; section three presents our data and analysis; 
and section four our results. Section five concludes.  
Public Support for Financial Assistance and Aid in the Eurozone 
European elites have invested credibility and sizeable amounts of tax money in defense of 
massive cross boarder transfers and bailouts to over indebted fellow governments that are 
often struggling with rampant corruption and mismanagement. The number of studies 
investigating the factors that drive public support for such transfers are thus far very few and 
quite recent (Bechtel et al 2014). Redistribution and aid within the EU offers a unique point of 
analysis – transfers are not made to certain individuals (the poor, the elderly, etc.), but to 
certain geographic areas (countries and/or regions).  While this occurs within the context of 
foreign aid as well, unlike typical foreign aid type transfers that generally go to the world’s 
least developed countries, the recipient countries are all relatively quite developed within the 
EU
16
. What may explain public support for such financial assistance?  As support for many of 
the EU’s policies (enlargement, single currency, etc.) tends to be correlated; public support 
for within-EU redistribution could be driven by factors that generally explain support for 
other EU policies.   
Drawing on the extensive literature on public support (or skepticism) for EU integration 
broadly speaking (see Hobolt and De Vries 2016 for a more complete overview), we know 
from recent research that EU support is multidimensional. For example, Boomgaarden et al. 
(2011) argue that a single latent idea of support or opposition is too broad, and they find that 
there are (at least) five different distinct dimensions of EU support.  One such specific policy 
area is the idea of economic redistribution within the EU.    
                                                     
16
 According to the World Bank’s latest data, the EU’s poorest country by per capita GDP (Bulgaria) ranks 63 
out of 186 countries. 
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Surprisingly, only recently have a handful of studies sought to understand what factors 
explain public support for international financial assistance, in particular within the EU (for 
recent exception see i.e. Bechtel et al 2014 & 2015; Daniele and Geys 2015; Stoeckel, & 
Kuhn, 2017; Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014). Bechtel et al. 2014 analyze why German citizens 
support EU bailouts to other countries within the Eurozone, finding that typical explanations 
of self-interest (income levels) are trumped by factors such as altruism and cosmopolitanism.  
Daniele and Geys (2015) find also that across Europe, individual level factors such as trust in 
the EU, age, altruism, and ideology trump income levels for supporting fiscal integration in 
times of economic crisis.  National identity is also found to be a salient (negative) predictor of 
support for EU economic governance in general, especially among citizens in wealthier 
countries (Kuhn and Stockel 2014).  Others point more to the influence of domestic politics 
and the information cues about international bailouts that come from one’s political party 
(Stokel and Kuhn 2017).  Although the inter-country transfer system within the EU is 
extensive, such studies on public support for redistributing funds within the EU are 
surprisingly still relatively few in number and the literature tends to be focused on select 
countries, such as Germany, mainly due to data limitations
17
.  
In their recent overview of studies on public support for European integration, Hobolt and de 
Vries (2016) suggest that the literature explaining support has mainly focused on three types 
of explanations: utilitarian, identity-driven and “cue-taking and bench-marking with reference 
to the national political context” (p.414). They also suggest that we know comparatively little 
on “how diverse national contexts shape people’s perception of the European Union” (ibid.).  
Oftentimes, divides are defined in economic terms, “as many voters in the North oppose open 
borders and fiscal transfers, whereas voters in the South call for more EU redistribution” 
(Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Hobolt 2015). However, while it is hardly surprising that 
economic factors do matter for support for redistribution, we suggest that the literature thus 
far has paid insufficient attention to the potential explanatory power of cue taking based on 
the functioning, or quality of domestic government institutions. Studies point to factors such 
as the media or political parties as “short cuts” to opinions on the EU, since citizens on 
average can be expected to have less direct information on the EU than on their domestic 
government. Surprisingly little attention has, however, been directed to the potential 
importance of experiences of the functioning of domestic institutions (Anderson 1998, 
Kritzinger 2003), and the literature presents somewhat conflicting results on whether good 
                                                     
17 Although several Eurobarometer surveys exist on public awareness of EU Regional policy for example, there 
are no proper questions regarding support for the idea.  
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experience of domestic institutions or democracy helps support for the EU or not (Muñoz et 
al. 2011; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2000).  
 
In particular, very few of these studies on support for the EU or the emerging literature that 
deals specifically with support for financial assistance and bailouts within the EU investigate 
the potential impact of corruption, or the quality of domestic institutions as a source of 
variation in support
18
.  Here, we build on a few studies that investigate the impact of 
corruption on support for foreign aid, i.e. international redistribution outside of the EU. While 
several recent studies investigate the determinants of support for foreign aid
19
, the particular 
role of corruption has mainly been studied at cross national level, focusing either on its effect 
on aid disbursements or public support for foreign aid (Chong and Gradstein, 2008: Bauhr et 
al. 2013). For example, Chong and Gradstein (2008) find that domestic levels of corruption in 
donor countries drive down aid levels, and that donor government’ efficiency and corruption, 
rather than the level of corruption in recipient countries affects aid generosity.  
Thus, despite a large literature on preferences for national inter-personal redistribution, 
international redistribution and foreign aid, very few studies investigate the effects of the 
quality of government institutions and corruption on public support for international financial 
assistance and aid. This is, to our knowledge, the first study that investigates the impact of the 
quality of domestic institutions and corruption on support for redistribution within the EU.   
 
Corruption, Collective Action Capacity and Support for Financial Assistance 
 
Some of the most influential explanations for redistributive preferences depart from theories 
of economic interest and capacity, suggesting that citizens would be less likely to support 
international redistribution in bad economic times compared to good economic times 
(Heinrich et al. 2016), when resources would presumably be less abundant and seen as better 
spent domestically. Furthermore, richer governments typically disburse a larger share of their 
GDP in foreign aid than do countries with a lower level of GDP per capita (Chong and 
Gradstein 2008). Similarly, it may be reasonable to expect that support for international 
                                                     
18
 These findings are generally mixed. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) argues and finds that country-level corruption 
increases support for EU integration, while Rorschneider (2002) finds that a positive interaction on EU support 
between better functioning institutions and a feeling that ‘EU represents me’.  Moreover, these studies employed 
samples of only EU15 countries as they were conducted prior to the large expansion in 2004.   
19
 For the determinants of support for foreign aid see i.e. Heinrich et al 2016; Milner & Tingley, 2013; Paxton & 
Knack, 2012;  
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redistribution or bailouts would at least partly be determined by citizens’ perceptions of their 
government’s economic conditions, such as level of GDP per capita or public debt.  
However, there are several distinct albeit inter-related reasons why domestic levels of 
corruption and quality of government may be important to understand redistributive 
preferences, and, we suggest, potentially have a stronger explanatory power than traditional 
economic variables such as GDP/capita or public debt. In particular corruption and poor 
quality institutions reduce the supply of public goods, and may thereby create public 
resignation and disillusionment about the capacity and potential of the political system to 
redistribute resources in the first place. It may also accentuate demand for particularistic 
payoffs, incentivize “free riding” and thereby undermine the willingness to contribute to both 
domestic and international public goods. In other words, the quality of government may 
increases both the supply and demand for public goods provision and thereby serves to 
promote an increased support for international redistribution and bailouts.  
EU countries’ contributions to inter-EU financial assistance, including both bailouts or other 
types of transfers, could be seen as a collective action problem, to the extent that the aim is to 
stabilize EU’s common currency and prevent financial crises that can have repercussions on 
the entire financial system of the EU. Therefore, national contributions to redistribution 
within the EU can be viewed as a collective action problem and the funds as a non-
excludable, international public good (Ostrom 1999; Bechtel et al. 2014), meaning that 
everyone can enjoy them, and every country could choose to “free-ride” on other countries’ 
contributions to international redistribution. 
 
 In this perspective it can be useful to distinguish between collective action capacity and 
perceptions of the problem being a collective one in the first place. While the first pertains to 
governments (perceived) capacity to contribute to public goods provision, the latter pertains 
to whether there is a sense of belonging to a collective entity at hand. Some citizens may for 
instance believe that governments have the capacity to solve collective problems and 
redistribute resources, but do not believe that there is a collective problem to be solved and 
vice versa. The quality of government institutions could potentially influence the sense of 
belonging to the EU.  Some studies suggest that citizens are more willing to transfer authority 
to the EU if they are dissatisfied with their own domestic institutions - this is sometimes 
referred to as the “compensation hypothesis” (Muñoz et al. 2011; Kristinger 2003; Sánchez-
Cuenca 2000), because citizens would prefer supranational authorities to deal with problems 
if their own institutions are failing.  
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Citizens’ perceptions of governments’ collective action capacity instead, relate to 
governments supply of public goods provisions, which ultimately have repercussions on 
citizens demand for such goods. While the influence of the quality of government institutions 
and domestic levels of corruption on citizens’ international redistributive preferences has thus 
far received scant attention, particularly so within the EU, several studies suggest that 
corruption and clientelism severely undermine governments’ ability to collect taxes and not 
least use the taxes collected for redistributive purposes (i.e. Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; 
Brautigam et al. 2008; Bratton 2012).  In line with fiscal contract theories, governments do 
not possess sufficient coercive power to simply impose their will on society, but must bargain 
with citizens and provide services and policy in exchange for the revenue collected (Levi 
1989; Levi et al. 2009; North 1981; Bates and Lien 1985).  In other words, citizens accept 
taxes partly because they believe that governments use the revenues collected wisely.  
There is considerable empirical evidence for the contention that better quality of government 
increases public confidence in government institutions  (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang 
and Chu 2006; Seligson 2002). Corruption and quality of government is closely related to 
government legitimacy (Gilley 2011), and trust in government capacity to provide public 
goods. Therefore, people who perceive government institutions as fair and efficient may be 
more likely to trust that resources will be used in an impartial manner and provide public 
rather than particularistic goods (Rothstein et al. 2012; Svallfors 2013). Furthermore, good 
quality of government and low levels of corruption may also increase social trust (Rothstein 
and Uslaner 2005), which is typically seen to improve societies’ collective action capacity.  In 
the logic of collective action theory, both citizens’ expectations about fellow citizens’ 
contributions to collective goods, and governments (or other authorities) sanctioning capacity 
are important for citizens’ willingness to contribute to the provision of collective goods 
(Ostrom 1999). Low quality of government may undermine both of these conditions for 
collective action. In countries with poor government institutions, citizens are more likely to 
turn to other problem solving networks outside of public institutions to deal with problems 
that they face (Nichter and Peress 2016), and quid pro quo transfers and personal exchanges 
of goods and services typically becomes the norm (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2012 Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson 2007).  
 
To what extent might experiences of impartial government institutions and well-functioning 
public good provision extend to a more general willingness to support international financial 
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assistance, aid and supply of international public goods? In line with a “congruence 
hypothesis”, citizens are likely to use “cues” about the performance of their domestic 
governments to assess the trustworthiness of other governments or supranational authorities, 
which they presumably would know less about
 
 (see i.e. Muñoz et. al 2011)
20
. If people 
perceive government institutions as corrupt and inefficient, they might believe that the taxes 
collected to provide financial support to other EU member countries will be wasted or not 
properly used in the hands of corrupt recipient government officials. In other words, citizens 
from countries with poor functioning institutions might believe that the root problems to 
countries in a financial crisis are similar to problems in their own country – that elites in other 
recipient countries are corrupt as well and would find ways to siphon funds for their own 
benefit.  The quality of domestic government institutions is also linked to the level of trust for 
supranational authorities, such as the EU. Here, the relationship may potentially run in both 
directions. Citizens’ in countries with well working domestic institutions may use “cues” 
about the functioning of government and trust in their own domestic institutions may 
consequently spill over to a higher level of trust in EU institutions. However, citizens’ 
exposed to domestic institutions rife with venality may also, in line with the compensation 
hypothesis discussed in the above, express a relatively higher level of trust in EU institutions. 
Trust in both government institutions, both domestic and EU level, may, in turn , generate a 
stronger support for international financial assistance. 
In other words, the quality of government may influence the willingness to pay taxes and 
institutional trust and thereby societies collective action capacity and willingness to contribute 
not only to domestic but also international public goods, including support for international 
financial assistance. Government corruption may thereby reinforce and propel a negative 
spiral since a continuous undersupply of public goods may create further disillusionment of 
the potential of the system to contribute to solutions that benefit many as opposed to a few. 
This forms our hypothesis: 
 
H.  Polities with higher levels of corruption will have lower public support for financial 
assistance within the EU on average. 
 
In sum, we expect corruption and lack of quality of government to reduce citizens’ trust in the 
capacity of governments to redistribute resources fairly and impartially and thereby reduce 
public support for international financial assistance.  
                                                     
20
 see also Harteveld et al.  (2013; 561).  
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Research Design, Data, Measurement and Estimation 
As our hypothesis is mainly regarding how macro-level institutions affect individual level 
attitudes, we employ a comparative, observational design, with data from a recent European 
Elections Survey (EES) from 2014.  The survey contains a representative sample of all EU28 
countries and collected roughly 1,100 respondents per country, totaling 30,065 interviews
21
.  
All the interviews were carried out face to face (by way of Computer-Assisted Personal 
Interviews).  The EES survey employed here offers the best possible data among those 
currently available due to the wide scope of individual level factors that we can account for 
included in the survey.   
To measure our dependent variable – support for financial assistance within the EU – we use 
the following question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
In times of crisis, it is desirable for (OUR COUNTRY) to give financial help to another EU 
Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties. The responses range from 1-4 
– ‘strong agree’ to ‘strong disagree’ and we reversed scale to make higher numbers equal 
more support.  For purposes of parsimonious presentation and more meaningful interpretation 
we transform this into a binary variable – ‘support’ (3 and 4) vs. ‘no support’ (1 and 2), as we 
are more interested in what explains the threshold between ‘2’ and ‘3’ than the other 
categories. With respect to geographic differences, we observe noteworthy variation across 
countries; with the max country value 0.843 (Sweden) being over a full standard deviation 
higher than the min country value of 0.305 (Slovakia).   
Explanatory variables: macro-level 
The main contextual-level variable of interest to this study is the quality of institutions or 
level of corruption in a given polity.  We elect to measure institutions at the sub-national level 
rather than national. First, several studies have shown that the quality of institutions not only 
varies significantly across EU countries, but within them as well at the regional level 
(Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2015). Thus based on our expectations, we should even 
observe a significant amount of variation in support within countries – with support being 
higher (lower) in better (poorer) functioning regions; thus the sub-national level provides a 
stronger case for our theory
22
. We proxy institutional quality with the 2013 version of the 
‘European Quality of Government Index (EQI, Charron et al. 2015), which to date is the best 
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 Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg are the exceptions, and have roughly 540 respondents each.   The ESS survey 
was commissioned by the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit of the European Parliament and was done by TNS 
Opinion together with its local partners between 30 May and 27 June 2014 
22
 Regions here equate to NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 depending on the country.  Countries with data for NUTS 1 are Germany, UK, 
Sweden, Hungary, Belgium and Greece, and NUTS 2 level for all others.   
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available proxy for the level of impartiality and corruption in regional public institutions. 
While the EQI is based on aggregate citizen perceptions and experiences with regional 
institutions, we also check the results using a more objective measure of institutional quality – 
a corruption risk measure developed by Fazekas and Kocsis (2015), which builds on 1.4 
million public procurement contracts to capture the number of single bidders per region in 
high cost public procurement, indicating possible collusion among elites.   
While admittedly many structural factors could be driving support for redistribution within 
the EU, we focus our attention on potential confounding relationships between institutional 
quality and support. First, it is possible that the effect of poor institutions on support for 
redistribution works via a region’s overall level of development, thus we control for this with 
GDP per capita by region. Next, the relationship could be spurious to a region’s level of 
income inequality, which could be a driver of lower institutional quality (Jong-Sung and 
Khagram 2005) and has been directly linked to Euroscepticism in general (Kuhn et al. 2016).  
While no perfect measure of income inequality exists for EU regions, we proxy this concept 
with the percentage of residents at risk of poverty by NUTS region, averaged for the five 
years prior to the survey to include as many regions as possible (2009-2013, Eurostat).   
Explanatory variables: micro-level 
As we are mainly focused on macro-level factors in the theoretical section, we rely on the 
newly established literature on public support for inter-EU economic redistribution and 
financial support for individual level controls.  Most all studies control for ‘utilitarian’ type 
factors (Daniele and Geys 2015; Bansak et al 2016; Stockel and Kuhn 2017) To capture one’s 
‘self-interest’ in support for redistribution, while the survey does not give a direct measure of 
income, it does include a proxy: during the last 12 months, would you say you’ve had 
difficulty to pay your bills on time? (1=most of the time, 2=from time to time, 3= almost 
never/never).  Next, we also account for the respondent’s level of education, which has found 
to be highly salient in explaining German public support for bailouts to other EU countries in 
crisis (Bechtel et al 2014; Stockel and Khun 2017).  The EES survey provides a variable for 
the number of years completed in school.  A third individual factor we include is whether 
someone is employed or not. In addition, we also include the respondent’s subjective views of 
the economic situation in their country relative to 12 months ago. 
Building on previous works about support for EU integration in general, recent findings in the 
public support for inter-EU economic redistribution and financial support show that political 
attitudes, values and ideology have strong explanatory power (Daniele and Geys 2015).  We 
attempt to capture this in several ways. First, to account for traditional left-right political 
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views of the respondents, we use a question whereby respondents are asked to self-place 
themselves on a 10 point left-right scale.  Similar to Bansak et al (2016), who find that left-
right divides are particularly salient in explaining views on Grexit, we re-code the 10 point 
variable so that it goes from 1 (far left) to 5 (far right).   Second, a growing number of 
scholars point to a second dimension as being especially relevant in the EU context (Van 
Spanje and Van Der Brug 2007), the so-called ‘gal-tan’ dimension 
(Green/Alternative/Libertarian versus Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist), which tracks 
people’s attitudes of state control over various social-cultural/ ‘post-materialist’ issues.  We 
construct an index of three correlated questions (all 0-10, higher values equal more ‘tan’) on 
same-sex marriage, civil liberties and the environment.  Next, the strength of EU identity 
relative to a respondent’s domestic identity explains support for a host of EU policies 
(McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2009). Here we proxy this with a question on 
respondents’ attitudes on EU integration; whether the EU should have more or less budgetary 
control over member states, which previous studies have found relevant in explain attitudes of 
support for EU integration (Van Spanje and Van Der Brug 2007). Finally, we control for 
gender and age.   
Regarding ‘cue taking’, scholars have shown that there is a strong relation between party 
support and support for various EU policies because citizens tend to take cues from the 
platforms of party elites (Steenburg and Jones 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2009). Moreover, 
Stockel and Kuhn (2017) find party support relevant in explain German support for EU 
bailouts.  We anticipate that supporters of EU skeptic parties will be least likely to support the 
idea of sending tax money to other struggling EU states.  In the EES survey, respondents are 
asked what party they would vote for if their general parliamentary election was tomorrow. 
Using party affiliation with various party groups at the EU level, we code a respondent’s party 
preference as ‘EU skeptic’ if they would vote for a party belonging to the Europe of Nations 
and Freedom Group (ENF), Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD), or the 
European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR); as all three of these party groups are 
openly Eurosceptic.   
All variables are standardized for the sake of comparison (using a min-max, from 0-1). A 
more thorough description of all variables mentioned in this section along with summary 
statistics is presented in the appendix.   
With respect to our estimation methods, we elect to use hierarchical estimation with random 
intercepts at the regional level. Shifting from the country to the regional level offers several 
advantages, namely avoiding ‘whole country bias’, giving better precision in capturing spatial 
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differences of the macro-level variables as well as increasing the number of second level units 
in the model by more than six-fold (from 28 to 183), which significantly reduces bias in the 
estimates (Stegmuller 2013) and allows for potentially more control variables. In addition, we 
check the results using standard regression and regional clustered weights, which allow for 
the use of EES survey design weights. We elect not to run fixed effects models, in order to 
directly test the macro level effects of institutions. The dependent variable is an ordinal 
variable with four responses, and for purposes of more straight-forward presentation, we 
present the main results with hierarchical logit regression, whereby we re-code the dependent 
variable into a binary variable focusing on the variation of greatest interest – support versus 
lack thereof (‘totally disagree’ and ‘tend to disagree’ = 0 and ‘totally agree’ and ‘tend to 
agree’ =1).  In addition, we present estimates using both hierarchical logit with the original 
variable scale as well as OLS with the binary outcome variable for clearer interpretation of 
the marginal effects.  
Results 
We begin with a simple scatterplot illustrating the relationship between regional quality of 
government (EQI) and support for redistribution within the EU for 183 EU regions
23
.  
Overall, we see a fairly strong and positive relationship; regions with better institutional 
quality on average tend to show higher levels of support.  At either end of the spectrum, we 
see Calabria (ITF6) with low EQI and support for redistribution, while Schleswig-Holstein in 
Germany and Northern Sweden (SE3) have the highest level of overall support and are among 
the best performing regions on the EQI.  The Pearson’s coefficient is 0.48 for the sample.  
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 We use the ESS design weights in aggregating by region. 
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Figure 1: Institutional Quality and Aggregate Support for within-EU Redistribution 
 
 
 
Yet figure 1 demonstrates only aggregated estimates, which could lead to ecological fallacy. 
Thus we proceed to multi-level modelling in Table 1. with the results of an ‘empty’ 
hierarchical model (not shown) accounting for regional random effects show that roughly 
75% of the random variation is due to the individual level, and roughly 25% is attributed to 
the regional level (p<0.000). Thus the multilevel, random effects intercept approach is 
appropriate, and will reduce the likelihood of type I error (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).   
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Table 1: Public Support for EU Bailouts: Hierarchical Estimates 
    
Variable 
1. Macro-level 
factors 
2. Individual 
level factors 
3. Full model   
4. ordered 
logit 
estimation 
5. LPM 
Regional Institutional quality 
(EQI) 
1.30*** 
 
0.84***  0.67*** 0.18*** 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.24)  (0.22) (0.05) 
Regional GDP p.c. 0.64 
 
0.54  0.55 0.11** 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.38)  (0.34) (0.08) 
Regional Inequality 0.48 
 
0.64**  0.65** 0.14** 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.30)  (0.25) (0.06) 
female 
 
-0.07** -0.06**  -0.08*** -0.01* 
  
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.006) 
age 
 
0.25*** 0.24**  0.30*** 0.05** 
  
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.01) 
income 
 
0.21*** 0.20***  0.17*** 0.04*** 
  
(0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.01) 
education 
 
0.89*** 0.90***  0.92*** 0.19*** 
  
(0.08) (0.09)  (0.07) (0.02) 
unemployed 
 
-0.05 -0.06  -0.04 -0.01 
  
(0.06) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.01) 
economic sat. 
 
1.38*** 1.37***  1.32*** -0.29*** 
  
(0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.01) 
Gal_Tan 
 
-1.12*** -1.09***  -1.10*** -0.23*** 
  
(0.09) (0.09)  (0.08) (0.02) 
Far-left 
 
0.22*** 0.22***  0.19*** 0.04*** 
  
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.01) 
Center-Left 
 
0.27*** 0.27***  0.23*** -0.05*** 
  
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.01) 
Center right 
 
0.19*** 0.19***  0.14*** 0.04*** 
  
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.01) 
Far right 
 
0.22*** 0.23**  0.19*** 0.05*** 
  
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.01) 
 
 
     
  
     
Vote EU Skeptic -0.60*** -0.61**  -0.58*** -0.13*** 
 
 
(0.06) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.02) 
EU integration (oppose) 
 
-0.93***  
 
-0.99***  -0.19*** 
  
(0.05)  
 
(0.05) (0.01) 
Constant/ cut 1 -1.13 (0.25) 0.11 (0.09)   -0.84 (0.20) 0.32 (0.17) 
cut 2 
  
  0.63 (0.20) 
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cut 3 
  
  3.09 (0.20) 
 residual 
  
 
  0.46 (0.002) 
Random intercept  0.31 (0.04) 0.27 0.22 (0.03)  0.22 (0.03) 0.10 (0.01) 
Model Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Observations (regions) 28,276 (183) 20,987 (183) 20,662 (183)   20,662 (183)  20,662 (183) 
Note: models 1-3 are estimated using ordered logit with random regional level intercepts.  Models 4 uses the 
dichotomized dependent variable whereby ‘1’ equals support if the respondent is coded as ‘3’ or ‘4’ and ‘0’ if 
coded ‘1’ or ‘2’ on the original question scale.    Model 5 re-runs model 4 with OLS estimation, or a ‘linear 
probability model (LPM) to estimate marginal effects.  Comparison group in the left-right self-placement is 
‘center’.  All variables have been normalized so that they range between 0-1 for purposes of comparison.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Next, we test the regional level variables in model 1. H1 states that regional institutional 
quality is a salient factor in support for EU redistribution, and we find strong initial evidence 
of this claim here. As the EQI is a standardized measure, the measures of economic and 
development and inequality are also standardized (between 0 and 1), rendering their effects 
comparable.  We find the marginal effects of the EQI in the direction expected and significant 
(p<0.001), and over two and three times the effect of GDP per capita and income inequality 
respectively, both of which are negligible when holding constant institutional quality.  
In model two we examine the effects of the individual level factors on support for economic 
assistance for fellow member states in need. The findings here are highly consistent with the 
expectations of much of the EU public opinion literature in other policy areas.  People of 
higher socio-economic status (income and education) and those with more satisfied with the 
overall economy tend to be more supportive.  One’s party support also plays a role in the 
expected direction, with those who would vote for an EU-skeptic party being less supportive.  
Political ideology in terms gal-tan are in the expected direction, yet the more traditional left-
right measure distinguishes only center respondents (less supportive) from those on the left 
and right.  Attitudes on EU integration overall also track in the predicted direction; as 
opposition to these increases, a respondent’s level of support for financial help to other EU 
countries decreases. Finally, we find a consistent gender gap in support, with females on 
average being more negative to bailouts compared with males. 
In the third model we include all regional and individual level variables.  We find that while 
the effect of the EQI on the dependent variable is reduced somewhat, it is still significant, thus 
showing support for our hypothesis.  Individual level factors remain largely consistent with 
the results in model 2, while we also observe that regions with more inequality show more 
support for financial assistance on average.  For summary and visual purposes, following 
Bansak et al (2016) we replicate model three with a linear probability model in order to 
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produce marginal effects, which we show in Figure 2.  In sum, we find that the marginal 
effect of institutional quality is greater than that of GDP per capita or inequality.   
 
Figure 2: Summary of the Marginal Effects of Variables  
 
 
Note: marginal effects from linear probability model (LPM), model 4 Table 1.  Reference group for the 5 
category left-right ideology is ‘center’.  Baseline support for the dependent variable is 0.555.   
 
 
Testing the Mechanisms 
Having found support for our hypothesis that institutional quality is significantly linked with 
individual level support for inter-EU financial assistance, we attempt to better elucidate the 
causal mechanisms in this section.  Support for our proposed mechanism implies that we 
observe a significant relationship between our variable of institutional quality and a mediating 
variable, along with a significant relationship between the mediating variable and the support 
for our dependent variable, financial assistance.   Our three proposed mechanisms derived 
from the theory section are: citizens in poor institutional settings (1)  oppose any taxation of 
their income, (2) that citizen simply do not trust their elected leaders (national and/or EU 
level), and (3) are less inclined to feel like part of the collective (e.g. an EU citizen) thus less 
inclined to contribute to the collective.   In the appendix, these selected variables used to 
capture these concepts are more thoroughly explained.   
EQI
PPPpc
Inequality
Female
Age
Education
Income
Unemployed
Econ. Sat.
Far left
Center left
Center right
Far right
Gal_tan
EU skeptic party
Oppose EU integ.
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
predicted change in Pr(support)
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Table 2: Test of the Mechanisms 
    
1. support financial 
aid 
2. support 
taxation 
3a. Trust Nat only 
3b. Trust EU 
only 3c. trust both 
4. feel EU citizen 
EQI 
 
0.57** 0.18*** 2.08*** -2.32*** 1.07*** 0.24 
 
  
(0.25) (0.04) (0.23) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) 
 
Support taxation 0.53*** 
      
  
(0.06) 
      
Trust National 0.41*** 
      
  
(0.05) 
      
Trust EU  
 
0.48*** 
      
  
(0.05) 
      
Trust EU*Trust National 
 
0.14** 
      
  
(0.07) 
      
Feel EU citizen 0.48*** 
      
  
(0.04) 
      
Random effects  
        
 
        
Random intercept Var. 
 
0.23 (0.03) 0.08 (0.004) 0.11 (0.02) 0.24 (0.04) 0.22 (0.03) 0.46 (0.04) 
 
constant 
 
-1.42 (0.25) 0.30 (0.03) -4.21 (0.24) 1.84 (0.26) -3.45 (0.25) 0.14 (0.24) 
 
Type of hierarchical estimation logit OLS logit logit logit logit 
 
Observations (regions) 
 
19,808 (182) 20,518 (182) 20,389 (182) 20,389 (182) 20,389 (182) 20,970 (182) 
 
Model Chi2 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Note: multilevel OLS in model 1, 3a-c and 4 with multilevel logit as the dependent variables range as the dependent variables are binary in each case.  Model 2 uses 
hierarchical OLS with random regional intercepts.  .  All control variables from model 3, Table 1 included.       
 
 
 
In Table 2 we attempt to directly test some of these possible mechanisms at play behind our 
main finding.  First, we include measures of these three mechanisms to the main model (from 
model 3, table 1).   To capture one’s attitudes about government intervention in general, we 
take the following question ‘how much do you agree with the following: 0-10, 0 ‘You are 
fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services’ – 10=’You are fully in favour of 
cutting public services to cut taxes.’.  On the idea of political trust, we include two variables 
capturing trust in national and EU level institutions whereby we construct dummy variables of 
each and an interaction (e.g, one ‘trusts both’)24. Using this simple two by two scheme, we see 
                                                     
24
 National trust: “You trust the national parliament” (1-4).  EU trust: “You trust the 
institutions of the EU” (1-4), both are re-coded 0/1, where ‘1’ equals ‘trust somewhat’ or 
‘trust totally’. Reference group in model 1= ‘trust neither’.  
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whether various types of trust are related with aid support and then how institutions relate 
with different types of trust to better explore for the compensation vs congruence hypotheses 
in the literature.  To capture the idea behind acting collectively, we do not have a direct 
measure of whether one believe that the bailouts in fact do contribute to a ‘collective’ from 
which all benefit, but a necessary condition of this we argue would be whether one feels like a 
EU citizen or not, thus we capture this with the question “You feel you are a citizen of the 
EU” (1-4, ‘not at all’, - ‘yes, totally’), which is recoded 0/1.  
We find that the log of odds coefficient of the EQI is reduced by over one third compared to 
model 3 table 1, and that all mechanism variables have the expected effect on the dependent 
variable and are significant.  People who support more intervention in general, those who 
express political trust (both EU and/or national) and those who feel like EU citizens are more 
included to support EU aid on average.  In model 2, we examine whether there is a link 
between institutional quality and support for government fiscal intervention nationally, 
holding constant country-level and individual level factors.  Here we observe that citizens in 
polities with higher quality institutions also support raising government taxation to fund 
public services, while there is systematically less support for such measures in countries with 
lower QoG.  This gives us some insight about one potential mechanism – that citizens in 
lower QoG countries systematically support less state intervention in collecting revenues for 
collective goods and services.   
In models 3a-3c, we regress a question on political trust on QoG, country level GDP per 
capita and debt/GDP along with our set of control variables form Table 1.  Our findings 
suggest several implication of how institutional quality’s effect on EU aid support is mediated 
by political trust.  Our first model shows that compared with those that trust neither, those that 
trust both institutions are most likely to support the EU bailouts to fellow member states, 
followed by those who trust the EU only and then those of only the national parliament. We 
look at the relationship between institutional quality and each type of trust in order to tease 
out potentially heterogeneous effects.  First, model 3a regresses the explanatory variables on 
trustors of national parliaments only (e.g. and do not trust the EU).  We find a systematic 
relationship between the level institutional quality and overall trust (trust both, model 3c) and 
national-only political trust (model 3a), while we find a strong reverse pattern when looking 
at those who trust the EU only in model 3b.  This suggests that the compensation and 
congruence hypotheses might be working in tandem depending on the level of polity-wide 
corruption and institutional quality.  In higher corrupt areas, citizens might support EU-aid 
because they trust the EU more than the national government, while in lower corrupt areas, 
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citizens might be channeling congruence-type cues from their country or regional institutions 
and supporting EU-aid based on these trust cues.   
Third, while the trust results provide us some insights into this, we attempt to examine the 
link between institutions and support for inter-EU redistribution as an EU-wide collective 
action problem.  With no perfect question in the survey to employ here, one question does get 
at this sentiment – whether one feels like an EU citizen or not.  If not, there is not much of a 
collective to which one’s tax dollars can contribute.  Here, we do not find that there is a 
significant relationship between country level institutional quality and the feeling of 
belonging to the EU under control for our set of control variables.  Thus we can conclude that 
the mechanism of local institutional quality on attitudes toward inter-EU fiscal aid works via 
spill over effects from attitudes of domestic fiscal policy and trust of national leaders.   
 
Robustness checks  
First, we test whether our results are consistent when using an alternative measure of 
institutional quality for EU regions. We re-run the results using the objective measure of high 
level corruption risk in public procurement from Fazekas and Kocsis (2015) (see Table A2).  
Next, we re-run the analyses using country level variation in lieu of regional level variation at 
level two in the multilevel model (Table A3). For institutional quality, we employ a standard 
measures, the World Bank’s ‘control of corruption’ (Kaufmann et al. 2011). In addition to 
measures of inequality and economic development, we include even a country’s debt over its 
GDP (Table A4), and re-test H2 using the country level WGI measure in the cross-level 
interaction term (for bivariate results, see Figure A1). In addition, we re-run the models 
without the random intercepts, using standard OLS regression and regional clustered standard 
errors so as to account for design weights (Table A4). Next, we estimate the effect of our 
variables in split samples – EU15 and new Member States (NMS) (Table A5).  As Romanian 
respondents were found to be strong residual outliers, we also report the NMS sample 
estimates without Romania.  We find the strongest effects of the hypothesis in the EU15 – 
where variation of institutional quality is highest.  In NMS (with Romania) the effects become 
negligible, yet excluding the respondents from the outlying case, we find some confirming 
results.  In Table A6 we test further the effect of individual countries on the overall results 
and re-run multiple model 3s in Table 1, excluding one country at a time.  We report the 
coefficient of the EQI in each case, finding that while the overall effect of the EQI is 
weakened by excluding some countries (Italy) and strengthened when removing respondents 
from others (Romaina), the overall effect remains consistent.  
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Conclusion 
This study seeks to understand the determinants of public support for financial assistance and 
aid. In particular, we suggest that the quality of government institutions and corruption 
influence public support for redistribution within the EU. We suggest that increases in 
institutional quality lead to higher levels of support for EU financial assistance and bailouts, 
and that the mechanisms through which this occurs is more likely related to citizens belief in 
governments collective action capacity (i.e. trust in governments redistributive capacity and 
willingness to pay taxes) than citizens perceptions of that there is a collective problem to be 
solved (feeling of belonging to the EU). To test these hypotheses, we use recent survey data 
from the European Elections Survey (ESS). Overall, we find strong support for our 
hypothesis. Institutional quality is more strongly associated with support for international 
redistribution than other macro-level factors.  Holding all else constant, we find the effects of 
institutional quality at both the regional and country level to be consistently stronger than 
economic development, income inequality or debt to GDP (at the country level).. This means 
that institutional quality and low level of corruption may be a more important determinant of 
public support for international redistribution than most of the traditional explanatory factors, 
that are typically used to explain public support for redistribution, in the EU or globally.   
Building on a growing body of research on corruption and quality of government, we suggest 
that corruption undermines public support for international redistribution through two 
separate but interrelated effects. First of all, corruption undermines governments’ supply of 
public goods, and thereby lowers citizens’ expectations on governments’ redistributive 
capacity (Rothstein et al. 2012 Svallfors 2013). This, in turn, undermines citizens’ trust in 
governments’ capacity to collect and redistribute tax money fairly and efficiently, 
domestically as well as internationally. Second, corruption undermines citizens’ demand for 
public goods provision, such as contributions to international redistribution. Instead, 
corruption tends to nurture demand for particularistic payoffs and demand for tangible and 
personalized benefits (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2012: Kitcheld and Wilkinson 2007).  
Our results thereby have several noteworthy implications and contributions. They contribute 
to a better understanding of the effects of corruption and quality of government on public 
support for international redistribution in general, and for redistribution within the EU in 
particular. While there is a wealth of literature on support for EU integration in general, we 
examine a form of support for EU integration that has gone under-researched until quite 
recently – that of support for inter-EU financial assistance and aid. Unlike inter-personal 
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transfers from the wealthy to the poor within countries, or international foreign aid from the 
world’s most developed to least developed areas, the redistribution within the EU is neither 
inter-personal, nor necessarily to the ‘most needy’ areas.  We see this analysis as one of the 
first empirical investigations of public support for inter-EU fiscal redistribution.  
Furthermore, we follow up on a recent call by Hobolt and de Vries (2016) for more analyses 
on how national (or regional) context shapes individual level factors, and ultimately opinions 
about further EU integration. Our analysis attempts to do just this.  In addition, the regional 
level offers many advantages relative to the country level in hierarchical modeling. However, 
for skeptical readers, the findings also hold when using national level comparisons.. 
Remarkably, our results show that people who live in highly corrupt, poor institutional 
contexts are generally less supportive of aiding other EU countries in times of crisis on whole. 
However, we also show that quality of government influences citizens’ perceptions of 
government capacity to redistribute resources or use resources wisely rather than their 
propensity to recognize that there is an important collective problem to be solved.  
This type of redistribution, as well as the contemporary relevance of this question in particular 
for the EU, offers a number of potentially interesting research avenues and policy 
implications. First, to get a better sense of the overall support for redistributive policies within 
the EU among its citizens, future surveys should include questions about Cohesion policy and 
its components to test these ideas more thoroughly.  Second, our results have important policy 
implications.  While it is important to bear in mind that results are associational since we lack 
access to panel data, our model would not predict that the EU can ‘grow its way’ to greater 
levels of support for policies such as redistribution.  Such support seems to run deeper, as 
institutional quality and low corruption are long-term investments.  It is thus encouraging for 
those interested in a closer fiscal Union that the EU Commission has recently added 
“strengthening institutional capacity and an efficient public administration”25 to its thematic 
objectives for the 2014-2020 budget cycle. The fact that our hypotheses are supported with 
sub-national data implies the salience of building institutional capacity not only at the 
national, but also at the regional level. To increase support for greater fiscal EU integration, 
increased attention should therefore be directed towards the quality of domestic levels of 
corruption. With low support for inter-EU redistribution and bailouts, and improper handling 
of national transfers, current attempts to save crisis-stricken countries within the EU might 
                                                     
25
 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/social-fund/  
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fail. This could have adverse consequences for the financial system of the EU as well as for 
the future cohesion of the EU.   
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4. In God we trust? Identity, institutions and 
international solidarity   
 
  
Summary 
 
Several recent studies show that citizens’ identification with the EU is one of the most important determinants of 
support for EU integration, that may also hold the key to greater economic solidarity and support for 
international redistribution.  This article proposes a multidimensional conception of European identity, and that 
citizens’ support for redistribution within the EU is highly contingent not only on the level of identification with 
the EU but also on the nature of their feeling of belonging to the community at hand.   In particular, we suggest 
that citizens’ who feel European based on civic ties are more likely to support redistribution, than those that 
instead identify with Europe based on religion and in particular Christianity. Using unique and newly collected 
regional level data, we find support for these claims.  Thus, not only if or how much, but also why citizens 
identify with Europe matters for the level of social solidarity across boarder. 
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Introduction 
 
Why do citizens support sending their tax revenues to remote populaces? While public 
support for international redistribution may partly be attributed to purely utilitarian motives, 
social identities may be one of the key determinants of solidarity across borders. In particular, 
citizens who perceive themselves as part of a particular community are more likely to also 
want to share resources within that community. In the literature on EU integration, 
identification with the EU is often seen as one of the key explanations for support for further 
integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Börzel and Risse 2018). 
 
This paper suggests that citizens’ solidarity with remote EU populaces and preferences for 
within-EU redistribution is highly contingent on not only the level of identification with the 
EU but also on the fundamental nature or type of European identification that citizens’ hold. 
Thus, rather than only asking ‘if’ or ‘to what extent’ citizens’ identify with Europe, we 
suggest that redistributive preferences can be derived from asking ‘how’ or ‘why’ citizens’ 
identify with the Europe. We propose a multidimensional conception of European identity 
and investigate two dimensions of European identity: civic and religious.  In particular, we 
suggest that secular identification with Europe (civic), is more likely to drive support for EU-
lead redistribution, while citizens that base their sense of being European on religious affinity 
are more skeptical.   In particular the type of identification with Europe may determine 
important conditions for support for international redistribution, including support for EU-
lead redistribution, trust in the EU elite as well as beliefs in the likelihood that other countries 
will contribute to such collective endeavors.  
 
Data from an original and newly collected regional survey in Europe, that build on 17,147 
interviews carried out in 15 EU member states (Charron and Bauhr 2018) are employed. We 
show that citizens who believe that the Christian religion is of greater importance to being 
European than a civic identification, are less likely to support the central redistributive tool of 
the EU, cohesion policy, that aims to reduce regional economic differences. Those that 
instead base their identification with Europe on civic ties are much more supportive of inter-
EU redistribution. We propose and test several mechanisms as to why this is the case, 
including a weaker feeling of belonging to the EU in general, greater suspicion of ‘free riding’ 
by other Member States’, lower preferences for state-led redistribution in general and lower 
perceived benefits of EU economic integration.   
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The paper thereby seeks to make several important contributions. First, while several studies 
have shown that higher levels of European identification may facilitate support for European 
integration (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014), this paper 
instead investigates the explanatory power of a multi-dimensional conceptualization of 
identity (Bruter 2004; Risse 2015). In doing this, we introduce a conceptual mapping of 
European identity on two dimensions, whereby we capture both the strength of one’s 
identification with Europe (vertical) as well as distinguishing European identity across 
various types - civic and religious categories (horizontal). We posit that the effects of civic 
identification is theoretically and empirically distinct from that of identification with Europe 
on the basis of religion and in particular Christianity. Second, to our knowledge, we are the 
first to measure directly European citizens’ support (or lack thereof) for Cohesion policy, and 
we introduce newly collected survey data in order to gain a closer understanding of the micro 
and macro level dynamics that drive support (or lack thereof) of EU regional polices. Third, 
we explore and test several mechanisms from our theory as to why variations in social 
identification influence support for cross boarder redistribution.  We show strong empirical 
evidence for the mechanisms proposed.  
 
Identity and social solidarity across boarders 
Echoing Laswells (1936) famous statement that politics is about “who gets what when and 
how", scholars and policymakers invest substantial time and efforts into understanding the 
determinants of redistributive preferences. Research on both domestic and international 
redistribution (i.e. Alessina and Ferrera 2005; Beremendi and Andersson 2008) suggest that 
redistributive preferences can partly be derived from economic self-interest, i.e  that support 
should be stronger among citizens that rely on the welfare state and in countries with poor 
macroeconomic performance. However, studies on citizen support for European economic 
integration point to the importance of several other types of explanations regarding support 
for redistribution, including values, trust in institutions, altruism, or cosmopolitanism (Bechtal 
et al 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Daniele and Geys 2015; Bauhr and Charron 2018).  In 
particular, studies highlight the importance of citizens’ identification with Europe for their 
general supportiveness of the European endeavor and integration overall and find that citizens 
are more supportive of EU integration if they do not exclusively identify with their home 
nation. (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Börzel and Risse 2018).    Also, 
cosmopolitanism, or the extent to which people have interest in, and care about, groups of 
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individuals that are geographically or culturally distant may be important in explaining 
support for financial redistribution. For example, holding a cosmopolitan social identity may 
increase the willingness to support and comply with international endeavors (Paxton and 
Knack 2012; Bayram 2017).  Bechtel et al. (2014) show that German citizens that express 
cosmopolitan and altruistic views are significantly less likely to oppose financial bailouts for 
crisis-stricken EU countries; a finding supported by Daniele and Geys looking at an EU-wide 
sample (2015).   
 
While this literature has made significant contributions to the field of research, we argue that 
several questions remain unanswered.  First, despite a sizable number of studies suggesting 
that citizens’ identification with Europe matters for support for EU integration (Hooghe and 
Marks 2005; 2009), most have conceived of, and measured, identity in a unidimensional way. 
Thus, we know comparatively little about the effect of different types of identifications with 
the EU (see Bruter 2003) – that is to say how one identifies as European, as opposed to 
whether they do so (or not).  European identification can be of several different types, citizens 
may vary substantially in what they mean by what it means to ‘be European’, and in particular 
the values they attach to it. This suggests that European identification is a multifaceted term 
and citizens may identify with the EU for various reasons, such as civic, cultural or religious 
reasons, which might have very different implications for supporting economic solidarity 
across the Union.  
 
  
Types of European identity and preferences for international redistribution 
 
Collective identity is a social construction that is mainly concerned with ‘who one is’ and to 
which group one belongs in relation to other groups.  Identity can thus be seen as the factor 
that bridges the self with its surroundings. Individuals construct their identity in relation to the 
outside world and create feelings of belonging to, or exclusion from, various subgroups (see 
i.e. Bruter 2003; Mummendey and Waldzus 2004).  In the European context, multiculturalism 
is emphasized within a framework of multi-level governance, where identities are conceived 
around supra-national, national or local boundaries (Hooghe and Marks 2005).  While the 
theoretical concept of territorial ‘identity’ has become nearly ubiquitous in studies on public 
support for European Integration in general (Hobolt and de Vries 2016), the measurement of 
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this concept remains strikingly blunt in most empirical studies. mainly due to a reliance on the 
standard questions included in Eurobarometer data.   
Traditionally, European identification focus on the strength of identification with the EU or 
Europe. Consequently, the method of operationalizing one’s ‘identity’ generally proceeds 
along the lines of investigating whether citizens “feel” part of a certain nationality ( British, 
French, Polish etc.) both the nationality at hand and European,  European only, or none.
26
 In 
practice, studies often use a binary variable expressing ‘exclusive national identity’, created 
for those who respond to ‘country only’27 (Hooghe and Marks 2004; 2005; McLaren 2007; 
Garry and Tilly 2009; Fligstein et al 2012; Serrechino et al 2013; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; 
Polyakova and Flgstein 2016).  Thus, in this standard operationalization, the measure is a 
lack-of identification, rather than identification with, Europe.  Alternatives to this measure 
generally include questions about ‘being proud to be a European citizen’, or the EU posing ‘a 
threat to our nation’ (Lubbers 2008; Boomgaarten et al 2011), or a self-placement on an 
ordinal scale that measures how ‘attached’ one is to Europe or one’s nation (Hobolt 2016).     
 
While these standard conceptions of European identities and proxies are parsimonious and 
have proven to be powerful measures capturing those who are most prone toward 
Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2005) they proxy identification with Europe along only 
one dimension – the strength of attachment/identity with Europe, mainly vis-à-vis one’s home 
country.  Yet it is unclear from questions of geographic ‘attachment’ or ‘identity’ what people 
actually mean when they conceive of belonging to ‘Europe’ or the ‘EU’.    Different 
conceptions of European identity can lead to different outcomes of collective support for EU 
policies, such as economic redistribution. To improve our understanding and precision in the 
measure, we build on several studies that suggest that European identity is a multi-
dimensional concept.  For example, Bruter (2003) points to civic and cultural components of 
how one views (or experiences) what is ‘European’.  Risse (2015) suggests that European 
                                                     
26 ‘do you feel COUNTRY only, COUNTRY and European, European and COUNTRY or 
European only?”’ 
 
27
 A slight variation on this main question is sometimes phrased:  
‘As well as your current citizenship, do you also think of yourself as a citizen of the European 
Union/(COUNTRY)? a) Often; b) Sometimes; c) Never.  
Whereby a respondent is coded as having ‘exclusive national identity’ is one who answers ‘never’ to Europe’ 
and something other than ‘never’ to one’s nation. 
 
 
 
 
 61 
identity contains at least three dimensions – ‘civic’, ‘sacred’ and ‘primordial’ (Risse 2015: 27-
28).  
 
Our conception of European identity contains two broad dimensions – horizontal and vertical.  
On the vertical axis, we conceive of the strength of identity with Europe (e.g. does one feel 
European?), a dimension that is most often captured empirically in the literature.  On the 
horizontal axis, we highlight the type of identification one associates with Europe (e.g. how 
one view what ‘being European’ means). Building on these aforementioned studies, we 
suggest that horizontal identification with the Europe is a continuum of two different kinds: 
civic and religious – concepts that range from a more secular to a more sacred identity with 
Europe.  The civic side refers to mainly rights, rules and laws that effect all citizens on a day 
to day basis, and citizens’ sense of “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1992).  The 
religious identification with Europe builds on adherence to the community on the basis of the 
dominant religion: Christianity (Kaiser 2007).  Figure 1 shows a visual of our European 
identity conception.  The operationalization of our framework is explained in section 5.2.  
 
Figure 1: A Multi-dimensional Conception of European Identity.  
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A central debate among scholars studying European identity has been whether ‘European-
ness’ is determined by common bonds of Christianity and Western culture or by its secular 
modern ideals of liberalism, universal human rights, democracy, tolerance and 
multiculturalism, which are far more reflected in the current institutions of the European 
Union (Casanova (2006). In particular, we posit that secular identification is distinct from 
non-secular identification for at least three interrelated reasons: (1) the belief in governments 
responsibility for redistribution (2) sense of belonging to the international community, and (3) 
relatedly, fears of ‘free-riding’ and perceptions of the extent to which other countries will 
contribute to collective endeavors. Each of these are discussed below. 
 
Secular identification with Europe may enhance belief in the extent to which governments, as 
oppose to civil society non-state actors or churches, bear the responsibility for redistribution. 
A growing literature points to the importance of religious ties for understanding support for 
the welfare state (Stegmuller et al 2011; Galen 2015) and pro-social values and the 
importance of helping others is emphasized in most world religions.  In many parts of the 
world, religious institutions have traditionally assumed a significant responsibility in 
providing welfare services and promoting compassion for the weak and poor (Chang 2005; 
Bloom et al 2015). While studies show that religiosity is associated with philanthropy, 
forgiveness and benevolence, this relationship is contingent on several factors, and the type of 
pro-sociality promoted by religions are generally nor universal in character and thereby tends 
to build on (and foster) in-group rather than out-group trust (Bloom et al 2015). Consequently, 
Oviedos (2015:13) recent review of the link between religion and pro-sociality concludes that 
only “some forms of religion are prosocial in some situations for some groups”. Thus, the 
literature points to several potential reasons why religiosity would undermine support for 
some forms of redistribution and in particular universal and secular government lead 
redistribution. A religious social identity may potentially place authority and redistribution in 
the hands of religious representatives rather than secular government institutions (see i.e. 
Norris and Inglehart 2004).  
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Furthermore, a social European identification based on religious ties may potentially weaken 
the sense of belonging to the community. Christianity has been seen as the defining cultural 
distinctions between Europe and its neighboring areas going back to the crusades (Stråth 
2002; Pope Benedict 2007
28
), and the work of Kaiser (2007) shows that the EU project in 
general began with predominately-Christian democratic roots, and not those of secular, 
technocratic elites. However, in recent times, the EU has become increasingly associated with 
secular values, potentially causing the alienation of citizens associating the EU with 
Christianity rather than more secular values. In particular, those that identify with the EU 
based on Christianity may in the modern days feel less identified with the community as a 
whole. In other words, identifying with Europe based on Christianity may undermine one’s 
preference for the use of secular-type institutions in Brussels as the main distributor of 
resources, in turn leading to a decreased support for redistribution. 
29
 
 
Related to the above, social identification with Europe based on religion may also lead to 
distrust in other countries contributions to the collective endeavor. National contributions to 
redistribution within the EU can be viewed as a collective action problem (Ostrom 1999; 
Bechtel et al. 2014), in the sense that everyone can enjoy the stability and growth generated 
by the redistributed funds, regardless of their own contributions (provided that others 
contribute). Therefore, support for redistribution may at least be partly contingent upon 
expectations on if other countries will contribute to redistribution, or if they, instead, choose 
to “free-ride” on the efforts of others. To a certain extent then, contributions may be 
contingent upon trust in the communities’ willingness to share the burdens as well as the 
benefits and reluctance towards redistribution may therefore be attributed to perceptions of 
other countries not contributing their fair share. A  social European identification based on 
religion may not only contribute to reduce the sense of belonging to the community, but also 
foster a distrust in other countries’ willingness to contribute. Since expectations about other 
parties’ contributions to collective endeavors is often seen as essential for the willingness to 
contribute (Aumann and Dreze 2008; Fehr and Fischbacher 2005; Gintis et al. 2005; Ostrom 
1998; Sen 1967), such beliefs may be deeply detrimental for the willingness to share 
resources across borders.  
 
                                                     
28
 https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/christianity_created_the_european_identity_pope_benedict_says  
29
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Thus, there may be several reasons why citizens that believe that Christianity is the most 
important aspect of what it means to them to be European would be more skeptical to 
government-lead redistribution in general. Skepticism towards state-lead redistributive 
programs may easily translate into a distrust in not only one’s own government and the EU, 
but also fellow government contributions to collective action problems, nurturing beliefs that 
neighboring EU countries are prone to free ride on collective efforts. This, in turn, may lead 
to a stronger focus on prioritizing the own country over others and therefore rather spend 
money at home than abroad.  This leads to our main hypothesis. 
 
H1. Civic identification increases support for redistribution within the EU, while religious 
identification decreases it. 
 
In sum, we suggest that not only attention to the vertical dimension of identity, i.e. if and how 
much citizens’  identify with the EU, but also closer attention to the horizontal dimension, or 
different types of identification with  Europe, may help better explain how when and why 
citizens support EU policies, and in particular inter EU redistribution.  
 
 
Research Design, Data and operationalization 
 
As our theory highlights individual and macro level effects on support for economic solidarity 
in Europe, we test our hypotheses with multi-level observational data.  In doing so, we present 
an original survey that is intended to help researchers better understand the micro and macro 
level dynamics that drive support (or lack thereof) of EU regional polices (Charron and Bauhr 
2018).  The survey includes over 35 substantive questions as well as seven demographic and 
background questions of the respondent.  The fieldwork was conducted during the summer of 
2017.  In all, 17,147 interviews were carried out in 15 EU member states.  The respondents, 
from 18 years of age or older, were contacted randomly via telephone in the local language. 
Telephone interviews approximately 12-15 minutes in length were conducted via both 
landlines and mobile phones, with both methods being used in most countries.  While budget 
limitations prohibited the inclusion of all countries, these 15 countries in this sample represent 
over 85% of the proportion of the EU population.  Countries were selected for purposes of the 
selected case study reports as well as on the bases of variation with respect to geography, size, 
and institutional quality (see appendix for more information).   
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The dependent variable: support for economic solidarity 
Redistribution within Europe – a multi-ethnic, linguistic and cultural area – offers a unique 
point of analysis; it is neither redistribution to the world’s poorest countries, nor are the 
transfers directed at the poorest people.  We propose that the best available proxy to measure 
citizen support for our idea is via Cohesion Policy, which is” the only real, significant 
redistributive mechanism in the EU … and probably the most scrutinized regional 
development programme in the world” (Fratesi 2016: 457)30. To our knowledge, we are the 
first to measure directly European citizens’ support (or lack thereof) for this policy.   
 
However, measuring public support for a Cohesion Policy is not as straightforward as other 
policy areas, such as support for the Euro, which can be asked more or less directly.  Previous 
Eurobarometer surveys of ‘Awareness of Regional Policy in the EU’ have consistently shown 
a relatively low level of awareness of this policy throughout the EU over the past eight years 
in which the question was asked to the public.  The latest four rounds of this Eurobarometer 
reported remarkably consistent results, with just over one third of respondents having heard of 
any aspect of Cohesion
31
.   
Given this relatively low level of knowledge of the policy in general, a direct question on this 
topic would most likely lead to invalid results.  Respondents were therefore given some brief 
and basic background information about the policy in question:  
‘As you might have heard, EU cohesion policy aims to reduce regional differences within the 
EU in things like economic development, and employment.  While all members contribute and 
receive some funds, the wealthier EU countries generally contribute more and poorer EU 
regions receive more funding on average.’ 
Respondents were then asked the question of policy support, whereby we repeated the 
multilevel governance and redistributive for emphasis.    “In your opinion, the EU should 
continue this policy, where wealthier countries contribute more, and poorer EU regions 
receive more funding.” Respondents answered on a 4-point scale – strongly agree, agree, 
disagree and strongly disagree.  The weighted sample averages for the responses were 27%, 
52%, 15% and 5% respectively, with less than 1% choosing ‘don’t know’.   
                                                     
30
 The policy represents approximately one-third of the EU budget, whereby citizens living areas at 90% level of 
the EU average with respect to GDP per capita receive over 80% of the funds.   
31
 The question was framed in each Eurobarometer survey: ”Europe provides financial support to regions and 
cities.  Have you heard about and EU co-financed projects to improve the area where you live?” In addition, the 
survey specified certain names, such as ‘regional policy’ and ‘structural funds’, in each case we observe that less 
than half of the respondents answer ‘have heard’.   
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In addition to asking about support of the general idea behind Cohesion Policy, following the 
work of Bechtel et al (2014), respondents were asked a question that attempted to capture the 
‘intensity’ of their support – e.g. would they want their country (e.g. their own tax money) to 
contribute more, less of the same to this policy.   
 
In your opinion, compared with what it spends today, should (COUNTRY) contribute, more, 
about the same, or less to this EU policy? 1. More, 2. About the same, 3. Less 
 
For the purposes of our testing our theory, this question is used as a primary indicator of 
economic solidarity as is implies that one’s own country (and tax revenues) are contributing, 
not simply receiving, as could be the case of supporting the policy in the previous question. 
The weighted sample averages are 18%, 59% and 24% respectively.  Figure 2 shows the 
variation in responses across countries, whereby we see difference that is greater than seven-
fold from the country expressing the most solidarity in terms of ‘spending more’ (Romania, 
36%) versus the least (Netherlands (5%). 
Figure 2: Distribution of Intensity for Economic Redistribution in 15 EU Counties  
 
Note: Weighted country means reported.  
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Main independent variables: identity  
Our main independent variables attempt to capture individuals’ multi-dimensional identity 
with Europe.  To operationalize this concept according to our conceptual framework from 
section 3, we take several question items from the survey.  First, as per measuring the strength 
of European identity, we use the following 11-point ordered-scale question. 
 
People may feel different degrees of identity with their region, their country, or with Europe 
on whole.  On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being ‘I don’t identify at all, and ‘10’ being ‘I identify 
very strongly’, how strongly you identify yourself with the following?: 
a. Europe 
 
We then move to capture the primary interest of our concept – the horizontal axis, or the types 
of identification one has with Europe. Beginning with the civic dimension, we employ the 
following questions: 
 
 
People have many different opinions about what ‘being European’ means.  On a scale from 0-
10, where ‘0’ means “not at all important” and ‘10’ means “very important”, how important 
are the following for you in terms of ‘being European’?  
a. The right to live and work in any other EU country 
b. Having the Euro currency 
c. Having a common European flag and passport 
For these three items, a principle component, factor analysis shows that the three items all 
load on to one factor (one Eigenvalue above ‘1’, proportion explained variance = 0.59). We 
then construct a civic index of European identity using the weights from the principle 
component analysis. 
Next, to capture religious identification with Europe, we focus on the broad identification 
with the predominant religion of the continent – Christianity.  For this, we take the following 
item from the same battery of questions above: 
 68 
d. The Christian religion  
This is arguably a new way of capturing this dimension in this literature, as previous studies 
have mainly looked at how the denomination of a respondent influences support for the 
European Union (Nelson et al 2001; 2011) or the level of one’s religiosity in terms of how 
often one attends religious services, etc. (Boomgaarden and Freire 2009).  Yet we should not 
take for granted that simply because one identifies with a certain denomination or is highly 
religious (or secular) that they necessarily define European identity as Christian (or not).  For 
example, one could be quite secular as an individual, yet acknowledge and even strongly 
identify Europe with Christianity, or vice versa.  Our question thus gets closer to the idea of 
how the Christian faith defines what European identity is – e.g. how strongly do people feel 
that Christianity defines ‘being European’.   
As we are interested in where one falls on the secular-religious continuum of the horizontal 
axis, we construct a measure using the secular and religious items. Here we subtract a 
respondent’s secular score from the religious one.  The score is scaled from -1 (fully secular 
identification) to 1 (fully religious identification).  ‘0’ implies that a respondent ranked the 
two dimensions equally.   
 
Figure 3: Identity with European Values: EU distribution and Means in 15 EU 
Countries 
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Note: Weighted country means reported from most religious (Bulgaria) to most secular (Spain) European 
identification.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the weighted means by the countries in the sample.  In general, we observe a 
non-trivial amount of country level variation on the secular-religious dimension of European 
identity, with several countries, mainly newer member state, identifying more on average with 
a more religious-type of Europe, while other states, mainly in the west, coming down on the 
side of a more secular identity on average.   
 
Control variables 
We also control for several factors highlighted in the literature on public support for EU 
political and economic integration.  First, many studies point to the importance of university 
education EU integration support (Hakhverdian et al 2013); a dummy variable is included if 
the respondent has a tertiary education of higher.    We anticipate that supporters of EU 
skeptic parties will be least likely to support the idea of CP as well as sending more of their 
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tax money to other EU regions (Hobolt 2007; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2017).  Using party 
affiliation with various party groups at the EU level, we code a respondent’s party preference 
(if the election were tomorrow) as ‘EU skeptic’ if they would vote for a party belonging to the 
openly Eurosceptic ‘Europe of Nations and Freedom Group’ (ENF), ‘Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy Group’ (EFDD), or the ‘European Conservatives and Reformists Group’ 
(ECR). 
We also control for potentially confounding effects of general political values.  For this, we 
take questions in the survey to account for the ‘left-right’ and ‘gal-tan’ dimensions.  In 
particular, on the ‘gal-tan’ dimension, we include questions about attitudes towards 
immigration, authoritarianism
32
 as respondents with higher ‘tan’ values have found to be both 
less supportive of EU integration and less prone to identifying with broader European values 
in general (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  We control for left-right ideology and preferences for 
domestic redistribution via a question on the extent to which respondent’s feel their own 
government should ‘take measures to reduce income levels’ in their country (0-10).   In 
addition, we also include a measure of control for one’s level of social trust. 
 
As our measure of solidarity is an economic policy that is highly redistributive in nature, the 
extent to which one supports such a policy could very well depend somewhat in part on one’s 
perception of one’s own regional status in terms of wealth (Cruces et al 2013; Balcells et al 
2015).  Thus prior to the two main questions, respondents were also asked to place their 
region within four groups in terms of GDP per head – the wealthiest 25% of EU regions, the 
second wealthiest, the third, and then the poorest 25% of EU regions.  We also include the 
level of economic satisfaction of each respondent (1-4, - ‘very dissatisfied’ to ‘very 
satisfied’), as European identity and support for integration could be spurious to one’s 
perceived economic benefits (Verhaegen et al 2015).  
 Further, we control for two contextual factors at the regional level.  First, several studies 
point to ‘cue taking’ effects of domestic institutions in explaining support for EU integration, 
highlighting such factors as corruption and institutional quality (Bauhr and Charron 2018, see 
also Andersson and Krizinger 2003; Munoz 2011).  We control for this using a measure of 
regional institutional quality, the ‘European Quality of Government Index (‘EQI’, from 
Charron et al 2015).  Second, we control for past levels of inter-EU fiscal transfers to regions 
via Cohesion Policy, as some evidence suggests that greater transfers are associated with 
                                                     
32
 The specific question formulations are found in the appendix.   
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higher levels of support for EU integration (Dellmuth and Chalmers 2015).  We include the 
amount of per capita Structural Funds for the 2007-2013 budget period (logged), which 
accounts for the duel confounding effect of level of economic development - the poorest 25% 
of regions receive by far the largest proportion of CP transfers, while the wealthiest 50% 
receive quite little comparatively.  This also captures any possible ‘good will’ created by EU 
investments that might explain higher support in CP in recipient regions where institutional 
quality may also be lower on average
33
.  This measure also accounts for valuable within-
country variation, as some countries (Italy, Spain, UK for example) have both ‘less 
developed’ and ‘more developed’ regions.  Summary statistics and question formulation for 
the survey variables are found in the appendix.  
 
In addition, we include standard controls for age and gender.  As there are undoubtedly 
country level factors that determine some of the variation among individuals that we cannot 
account for (as shown in Figure 2), we include country level fixed effects, as using a random 
effects model with only 15 top level observations can be less reliable (Stegmuller 2013).   
 
Empirical Results 
We begin by looking at the effects of both the vertical and horizontal measures of identity 
along with country fixed effects in the first model (‘baseline’), absent additional control 
variables in Figure 4.  H1 is supported in both the baseline model and full model with control 
variables – citizens with a more religious identification with Europe vis-à-vis civic are less 
likely on average to express support for economic solidarity within the EU, holding constant 
the strength of European identification.    In addition, we find that the strength of one’s 
identity to Europe increases the likelihood of support for inter-EU redistribution, confirming 
our expectations from the literature.   Calculating the marginal effects of a total increase (0 to 
1) in the religious-civic variable results in just under a one half of a standard deviation 
decrease in the dependent variable, while the same increase in the strength variable results in 
an increase of just over one standard deviation.   We thus see initial support for H1, that 
identifying Europe with Christianity implies a negative effect on economic solidarity within 
the Union, which adds to otherwise mixed findings on the micro-level effects of religion on 
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 Data are from: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/data-for-research/  
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support/skepticism for European integration in general (Nelson et al 2001; Casanova 2007; 
Boomgaarten and Freire 2009)
34
.   
 
Figure 4: Summary of the Results 
  
 
Note: logged odds estimates with 95% confidence interval (dashed line around estimate) from ordered logit 
models with country fixed effects (not shown) and using design/sample weights.  Estimates with confidence 
intervals that overlap the ‘0’ line are insignificant.  Reference category for income is ‘low’.   All individual level 
variables are re-scaled between 0-1 for direct comparability. See appendix Table A3 for full results. 
 
In the second column, control variables are added.  The effects of main variables are largely 
robust, although the effects of both identity measures weaken slightly.   It is worth noting 
however that the relative magnitude of the effects of the identity measures are the largest in 
the model.  The results of the control variables reveal that all thing being equal, younger 
                                                     
34
 Tests of the parallel odds assumption unsurprisingly shows violations among most all individual level 
variables. While in some cases this is significant, the effects of the main variables are constant across the two 
thresholds and vary only in the degree of magnitude.  For the sake of parsimony, the main results are reported 
here.   
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respondents display more solidarity with Europe, as do those with lower income. People that 
are more satisfied with the economy in their area are also more likely to express a willingness 
to contribute more.  In line with the literature, values such as wanting to place further 
restrictions on immigration, preferences for strongman leadership, and voting for an EU 
skeptic party lead to less support for economic solidarity in Europe.  The model also reveals 
that ceteris paribus, the average effects of social trust and preferences for domestic 
redistribution on the dependent variable are negligible across the sample.  Finally, the amount 
of EU Structural Funds received in the prior budget period does not systematically explain 
public support for economic solidarity. Figure 5 summarizes the effects of the main variable 
by outcome of the dependent variable, highlighting the tradeoff between preferring to ‘spend 
more’ versus ‘spend less’ over the range of religious versus secular European identity. We 
observe that at the highest levels of secular identity, respondents in fact are more likely to 
express support for their country ‘spending more’ on inter-EU redistribution, yet these 
preferences reverse as one’s religious identity increases relative to secular.  The more 
religious identifiers are just over 3.5 times more likely to claim ‘spend less’ compared with 
supporting ‘spend more’.   
 
 
 
Figure 5: Summary of the effects of type of European identity on Economic Solidarity 
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Note: results from the full model with controls in Figure 4.  Predicted probabilities shown for each outcome 
(95% confidence intervals provided) over the range of the religious-secular variable.  A histogram of the 
independent variable is shown, with the percentage of cases indicated on the right side y-axis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further Exploring the Mechanisms 
  In this section, we attempt to elucidate some of the underlying mechanisms as to why the 
type of identify matters for social solidarity across borders and support for EU lead 
redistributions. In particular, we seek to gain a closer understanding of why those that believe 
that the Christian religion is what binds Europe together, as opposed to civic values, express 
less support for international and interregional redistribution within the EU. As suggested 
above, we believe that a general level of skepticism towards all forms of government lead 
redistribution as well as a feeling of alienation from the primarily secular EU elite may drive 
the effect. In the section below, we use a number of new measures to test these mechanisms, 
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using both follow up questions on why citizens support or disapprove of cohesion policy and 
more general questions on perceptions of government institutions.   
 
Preferences for Domestic Redistribution and Perceptions of Free Riding 
 
We empirically test the first two mechanisms of our findings in Table 1.  Our first proposed 
mechanism is that a stronger religious European identity is systematically related with lower 
preferences for domestic redistribution in general. To investigate this, we employ the 
following question: 
 
(COUNTRY’s) national government should take measures to reduce differences in income 
levels among people in (COUNTRY) (0- fully disagree – 10 fully agree) 
 
Furthermore, those who identify Christianity with ‘being European’ may be less willing to 
contribute to inter-EU redistribution because they distrust EU institutions as well as fellow 
government’s contributions to collective problems, rendering contributions to government 
lead redistribution not only undesirable but also utterly ineffective.  We thus expect that 
Christian identification leads also to a greater risk of perception of more ‘free riding’ among 
others.  To test this, we take advantage of a follow-up question to our main dependent 
variable.   For all respondents who answered ‘less’ on the previous dependent variable, we 
ask the following: 
 
Could you just tell me on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “Not agree at all” and 10 
means “totally agree”, as to why you would want (COUNTRY’s) contribution to be less? 
a. (COUNTRY) pays too much while other EU countries do not pay their fair share 
 
We believe that this question aptly represents one’s perceptions of whether others in the group 
are ‘living up to expectations’, and thereby whether large scale government redistribution can 
at all be effective.  Respondents that score higher on this question imply to us that they 
believe that other states are taking advantage of their current generosity and are failing to 
reciprocate appropriately.  
 
We regress each of these questions on the set of identity, institutions and control variables 
used in the previous sections.  Yet to avoid sample selection bias, we estimate the model 
using a two-step, Heckman selection model, which runs selection and condition estimations.  
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The first stage of the model is a probit equation that serves as a selection of having expressed 
‘spending ‘less’ or not (e.g. ‘more/same’).  The second stage is the equation of the effects of 
our independent variables on each of the perception of others’ free riding’.  The model 
assumes that the error terms of these two models are related and will lead to bias if not 
accounted for.  The estimation essentially provides a test of this assumption with the 
parameter 𝜌, which gives us the correlation between the error terms of the two stages of the 
Heckman model – if 𝜌 is in fact significant, the two-stage model is appropriate, meaning 
standard OLS would be biased.  In addition to the Heckman estimates, which in our case 
derives second stage estimates from only roughly one-third of the sample as selected cases, 
we also show OLS estimates with country fixed effects.  Table 1 highlights the main results.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Test of Domestic Redistribution Preferences and Free Rider Mechanisms 
   
Preference for 
redistribution 
 
Free rider: first stage 
probit ('pay less'=1) 
Free rider: 
second stage 
Free rider: 
second stage 
variable     1 
 
2 3 4 
       Type of European identity 
      
 
Religious - civic 
 
-0.60*** 
 
0.82*** 0.88** -0.81*** 
   
(0.10) 
 
(0.06) (0.42) (0.22) 
Strength of identity     
 
European id 
 
0.06 
 
-0.77*** -0.64*** -0.57*** 
   
(0.07) 
 
(0.04) (0.37) (0.15) 
Constant 
    
-0.29*** 5.35*** 5.39*** 
 
   
(0.08) (0.69) (0.31) 
Obs. (selected) 
  
17,125 
 
17,147  17,147  (4,151) 17,147  
 
  
 
 
  
 Rho (s.e.) 
  
  0.07 (0.22) 
 Pr>Chi2 
  
0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
        Note: estimates are logged odds from ordered logit model in column 1 on preferences for domestic 
redistribution. 
estimates from two stage Heckman selection models in columns 2 and 3 (first and second stage respectively), 
and OLS in column 4.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Rho significance is calculated via Bootstrap method (100 
replications).  The dependent variables in columns in all columns but 3 range from 0-10.  Columns 1,2 and -5 
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use OLS estimation with sample and design weights (robust standard errors).  All models include country fixed 
effects and the battery of control variables used in Figure 3.  See appendix Tables A4 and A5 for full results. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.02, *p<0.10 (two-tailed) 
 
 
We first check the support for redistribution mechanism – that citizens with a more religious 
identity with Europe will prefer less government- led redistribution in general. We find this to 
be the case in model 1.  We also find that the strength of one’s identity with Europe does not 
systematically affect preferences for domestic redistribution. 
 
We then proceed to the estimates of the Heckman two-step model in models 3 and 4 – the first 
and second stages respectively.  The second stage is of particular interest here, as this 
elucidates the effects of the various types of identification on the perception of others’ free 
riding.  Here we find that both the type and strength of European identification significantly 
explain ‘free rider’ sentiments, yet in opposing directions.  Higher religious identification 
leads to greater fear of free riding.  We find similar supporting evidence looking at the sub-
sample of those expressing a ‘less’ response in the previous dependent variable in model 535.   
  
Sense of Belonging to EU Community and perceived benefits of Cohesion  
 
Not only support for and beliefs in the potential effectiveness of government lead 
redistribution may influence support for cohesion. As suggested above, skepticism may also 
be driven by a general level of alienation from the EU elite and lack of belonging to the EU 
community.  We test this mechanism more directly in this section. In particular, we explore if 
those who view ‘being Europe’ in a more religious vein are less likely to feel that they belong 
to current day Europe (e.g. identify less) all things being equal.  We would also expect that 
those with a stronger ‘secular identity’ would feel more belonging to Europe as well (e.g. 
identify more), such as a civic identification with Europe.  We first investigate whether they 
type of identification with Europe in fact leads people to feel more or less a part of Europe 
today (e.g. strength of identity). We test European inclusion under control for national 
identity, as the two tend to correlate and omitting the national indicator could lead to omitted 
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 We show this model due to the insignificant effect of Rho, which implies that the error terms are not 
significantly correlated in the first two stages of the Heckman model.   
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variable bias (Linacre 2000).  In the case of testing the second mechanism, we run OLS 
models with country fixed effects
36
.   
 
Next, we look into the perceived benefits of Cohesion policy by those that show intense 
support for Cohesion (e.g. prefer their country to ‘spend more’) - e.g. what do they expect to 
get out of this investment, and do logics differ according to the type of European 
identification one has?   The follow-up questions of why respondents support their country’s 
expenditures, or even prefer more, are based around the three dimensions of solidarity 
outlined by Sangiovanni (2013).  He defines European solidarity as being either ‘national’, 
‘member state’ or ‘transnational’.   In a sense, what we are asking is - given that a respondent 
supports more inter-EU redistribution, who do they think it will most benefit?  We attempt to 
capture these dynamics with three follow-up questions: 
 
could you just tell me on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “Not agree at all” and 10 
means “totally agree” as to why you would want (COUNTRY’s) contribution to be (more)? 
a. It is in (COUNTRY’s) interest to invest in poorer regions (national self-interest 
solidarity) 
 
b. b. It benefits everyone in the EU to invest in poorer regions (EU solidarity interest) 
 
c. “(COUNTRY) has a humanitarian obligation to end poverty throughout the EU” 
(International solidarity) 
 
We then regress each of these questions on the set of identity, institutions and control 
variables used in the previous sections.  Yet to avoid sample selection bias as per the previous 
table, we estimate the model using a two-step, Heckman selection model, which runs a 
selection and condition estimations as per Table 1.  Table 2 presents the results. 
Table 2: Heckman Two-stage Estimates: Strength of Belonging and Three levels of 
perceived gains 
  
Strength of 
European 
identity 
Strength of 
National 
identity 
Free rider: 
first stage 
probit ('pay 
more'=1) 
National 
interest 
EU solidarity 
interest 
 
 
Transnational 
solidarity 
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 In addition, we tested including strength of national id in the first three models, and while significant, it does 
not alter the main results in any meaningful way.  For lack of a solid theoretical justification, we leave this 
indicator out of models 1-3.   
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Variable   1 2 3 4 5   6 
Type of European identity 
       
 
Religious - civic -0.30*** 0.15*** -0.28*** -0.25 -0.92*** 
 
0.12 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.43) (0.37) 
 
(0.46) 
Strength of identity  
       
 
National id 0.45*** 
      
  
(0.01) 
      
 
European id 
 
0.39*** 0.33*** 0.98** 1.22*** 
 
0.61 
   
(0.01) (0.07) (0.45) (0.38) 
 
(0.48) 
         
         Constant 
 
0.25*** 0.25*** -0.77*** 5.97*** 5.67*** 
 
8.31*** 
  
(0.02) (0.17) (0.10) (2.11) (1.82) 
 
(2.24) 
Obs 
 
17,125 17,125 17,147 
17,147 
(2,736) 
17,147 (2,736) 
 
17,147 
(2,736) 
(selected, non-
selected) 
     
 
  Rho (s.e.) 
    
0.21 (0.51) 0.22(0.48) 
 
0.58 (0.43) 
Pr>Chi2 (F) 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
R2 
 
0.33 0.28 
    
 
 
 
Note: Estimates from two stage Heckman selection models, first stage reported in column 2, second stage (three 
separate models) reported in columns 3-5.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Rho significance is calculated via 
Bootstrap method (100 replications).  All second stage dependent variables range from 0-10.  All models include 
the full set of control variables and country fixed effects.  See appendix Tables A6 and A7 for full results. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.02, *p<0.10 (two-tailed) 
 
Models 1 and 2 investigate the strength of the perceived collectives to which the respondents 
belong as a function of the horizontal aspects of European identification and control variables.  
We see clearly that as religious identification with ‘being European’ exceeds that of a civic, 
this on average leads to a weaker feeling of identity with European in general and a stronger 
national identity (model 1), yet the opposite is the case for national identification (model 2), 
ceteris paribus. 
 
The next four models test the perceived benefits of Cohesion policy. The first stage in model 
2 shows the first stage probit model, which is now regressing having responded ‘more’ in lieu 
of ‘less’ spending on redistribution.  Models 4-6 highlight some of the reasoning behind why 
respondents answered the way they did.  Given one expresses support for the idea of inter-EU 
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redistribution, who do they think will benefit?  Interestingly, we find that among supporters of 
Cohesion policy, the effect of religious versus secular European identity is negligible on 
‘national interest’ (model 2).  In other words, this dimension does not significantly explain 
whether one expressed support for inter-EU redistribution to benefit one’s own country.  We 
also find a similar effect for ‘transnational solidarity’ (model 3), in that whether one sees 
Europe as religious or civic does not explain the extent to which one wishes to help poorer 
people in general.  However, the result of model 3 is quite elucidating – despite supporting the 
policy, we see that those with a religious identification do not believe that this benefits the EU 
in general (while those with a civic identification do).  This shows that in addition to 
supporting the policy less on average, even those religious identifiers that do are not thinking 
about the benefits for the EU as a community.    Thus, we find empirical support for our 
suggested mechanisms. The type of identification with Europe can influence support for and 
beliefs in the effectiveness of government lead redistribution in general, as well as the sense 
of belonging to the EU.  
 
 
 
Conclusion  
This paper seeks to explain variations in social solidarity across borders. We suggest that 
citizens’ support for redistribution within the EU is highly contingent not only on the level of 
identification with the Europe but also on the fundamental nature or type of European 
identification that citizens’ hold.   In particular, we suggest that citizens’ who feel European 
based on civic ties are more likely to support redistribution, than those that instead identify 
with Europe based on religion and in particular Christianity, irrespective of strength of 
identity. If citizens believe that religion and in particular Christianity is the glue that binds 
Europe together they are much less likely to support redistribution. This wide spread 
skepticism towards sharing resources across borders is linked, we show to a general 
skepticism towards government lead redistribution, including its effectiveness to reach 
desired ends. It is also linked to a greater alienation from the (primarily secular) European 
elite and a distrust in other countries contributions to international and inter- regional 
redistribution.   
 
Using unique and recently collected survey data, we show that the type of identification with 
the EU matters for redistributive preferences, and that in particular those with a secular basis 
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for identifying the EU are more likely to support within- EU redistribution than those that 
identify with the EU based on religious (Christian) ties. Moreover, we show that the 
magnitude of the effects of both dimensions of identity are the strongest predictors of support 
(or lack there of) for inter-EU redistribution.  In addition, we put forth several mechanisms 
through which this may occur, including distrust in the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
government lead redistribution, perception of benefits, sense of belonging to the EU and trust 
in other countries contributions to redistribution. Using additional questions from the survey, 
we are able to test the mechanisms of our theory directly, for which we find strong empirical 
support.   
 
While scholars have shown that the extent to which citizens “feel European” or identify with 
the EU has implications for their willingness to support EU integration and financial 
assistance in times of crisis (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2006, in Kuhn 
and Stoeckel 2014), these studies focus exclusively on the vertical dimension of identity, i.e. 
the perceived relative importance of national, regional or EU level identity. However, as we 
suggest above, identification does not only differ by level or strength, but can also be of 
fundamentally different types. Closer attention to the horizontal dimension, or different types 
and reasons for identifying the Europe, help better explain how when and why citizens 
support EU policies, and in particular inter EU redistribution. 
 
Our study suggests that future research on citizen support for European integration in general, 
as well as support for economic integration more specifically, should take into consideration a 
more multi-dimensional approach to European identity.  In addition, the next phase in better 
understanding variation of public support for EU economic integration should incorporate 
more contextual factors.  While studies suggest that “cue taking and bench marking” on the 
basis of national contexts (Hobolt and de Vries 2016) influences support for redistribution, 
studies typically assume that individual level determinants of redistribution are stable across 
contexts. Future research should investigate whether the effects of individual level 
determinants, such as identity, are contingent on institutional factors, such as domestic 
institutional quality or government capacity and competence. Finally, it raises the issue of the 
extent to which perceptions of what constitute a European identity is becoming more 
exclusive and in particular what implications this would have for European integration in the 
future. For example, some believe that ‘Christianity is Europe’s last hope’ (Viktor Orban, 
2018), in particular against keeping Europe anti-Islamic.   To some extent, a civic form of 
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belonging to a community through citizenship rights is more inclusive, in the sense that it is 
not granted by birth and thus may be easier to achieve for many, compared to  inclusion in a 
community based on more deeply by past historical ties, ethnicity, or even religion.  If support 
for within EU redistribution is currently primarily driven by citizens that identify with Europe 
on civic grounds, shifts in these perceptions may potentially have consequential implications 
for EU integration.  
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5 APPENDIX 
 
Appendix chapter 2 
 
Further background information on the survey 
 
This study presents an original survey that is intended to help researchers better understand 
the micro and macro level dynamics that drive support (or lack thereof) of EU regional 
polices.  The survey includes over 35 substantive questions as well as seven demographic and 
background questions of the respondent; geo-coded at the NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 
level.  The survey was funded largely in part from an EU Horizon 2020 grant (references cut 
for anonymity).  The fieldwork was conducted during the summer of 2017 by an international 
survey firm based in Rheims, France (Efficience3, ‘E3’), who have conducted several other 
large EU-wide surveys on behalf of the EU Commission.   The data was delivered to the 
authors in September 2017. 
E3 conducted the interviews themselves in several countries and used sub-contracting 
partners in others
37
.  In all, 17,147 interviews were carried out in 15 EU member states.  The 
respondents, from 18 years of age or older, were contacted randomly via telephone in the 
local language. Telephone interviews approximately 12-15 minutes in length were conducted 
via both landlines and mobile phones, with both methods being used in most countries.  All 
interviews were made by employees with at least one year of professional experience and 
used Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI).  Between 12%-15% of all 
interviews were randomly check for quality control by supervisors, with no reported 
irregularities. Decisions about whether to contact residents more often via land or mobile lines 
was based on local expertise of market research firms in each country, with mobile being first 
choice in all cases.  For purposes of regional placement, respondents were asked the post code 
of their address to verify the area/ region of residence if mobile phones were used.   
 
Sampling method 
                                                     
37
 http://www.efficience3.com/en/accueil/index.html. For names of the specific firms to which Efficience 3 sub-
contracted in individual countries, please write cati@efficience3.com  
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Ideally, a survey would be a mirror image of actual societal demographics – gender, income, 
education, rural-urban, ethnicity, etc.  However, sampling on demographics is much more 
costly.   Based on E3’s expert advice, to achieve a random sample, the ‘next birthday method’ 
was employed.  The next birthday method is an alternative to the so-called quotas method.  
When using the quota method for instance, one obtains a (near) perfectly representative 
sample – e.g. a near exact proportion of the amount of men, women, certain minority groups, 
people of a certain age, income, etc. However, as one searches for certain demographics 
within the population, one might end up with only ‘available’ respondents, or those that are 
more ‘eager’ to respond to surveys, which can lead to less variation in the responses, or even 
bias in the results.  The ‘next-birthday’ method, which simply requires the interviewer to ask 
the person who answers the phone who in their household will have the next birthday, still 
obtains a reasonably representative sample of the population.  The interviewer must take the 
person who has the next coming birthday in the household (if this person is not available, the 
interviewer makes an appointment), thus not relying on whomever might simply be available 
to respond in the household.  So, where the quota method is stronger in terms of a more even 
demographic spread in the sample, the next-birthday method is stronger at ensuring a better 
range of opinion.   
The next-birthday method was thus chosen because we felt that what we might have lost in 
demographic representation in the sample would be made up for by a better distribution of 
opinion.  In attempt to compensate for some key demographic over/under-representation, we 
provide weights based on age and gender for each region, comparing the sample drawn to 
actual demographic statistics from Eurostat.  A breakdown of the sample response rate, land 
line vs. mobile phone use, etc. is listed in the table below by country.  
 
Sample and further survey information 
The survey included 15 EU countries.  These 15 countries in this sample represent over 85% 
of the proportion of the EU population.  Countries were selected for purposes of the selected 
case study reports as well as on the bases of variation with respect to geography, size, and 
institutional quality.  The countries in the sample of this survey are the following and they are 
often refereed to via the following official abbreviations: 
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Table A1: Sample information 
Country Abbreviation respondents 
Mobile rates landline rates response rate refusal rate 
Austria AT 1000 30% 70% 10,0% 46,5% 
Bulgaria BG 503 82,10% 17,90% 32,0% 21,0% 
Estonia EE 5000 92% 8% 13,5% 38,0% 
France FR 1500 65% 35% 10,0% 26,0% 
Germany DE 1500 35% 65% 12,5% 46,5% 
Hungary HU 1000 100% - 22,0% 33,0% 
Italy IT 2000 38,5 61,5 16,2% 9,3% 
Latvia LV 500 100% 0% 13,0% 24,0% 
Netherlands NL 500 57% 43% 9,8% 29,1% 
Poland PL 2000 80% 20% 12,1% 15,7% 
Romania RO 1015 100% 0% 10,0% 47,0% 
Slovakia SK 1014 100% 0% 10,0% 48,0% 
Spain ES 2014 68% 32% 7,5% 17,1% 
Sweden SE 580 5,5% 94,5% 12,5% 28,3% 
UK UK 1500 37% 63% 12,5% 46,5% 
    total= 17147 
     
 
Survey questions used in analysis (see main text for dependent variables) 
 
Corruption perceptions 
 
‘On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being that ‘there is no corruption’ and ‘10’ being that corruption is 
widespread, how would you rate the following institutions?’ 
a. the European Union, b. your country, c. your region 
 
 
National identity 
 
‘On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being ‘I don’t identify at all, and ‘10’ being ‘I identify very 
strongly’, how strongly you identify yourself with the following?’:  
a. your region, b. your country, c. Europe 
 
perceptions of one’s relative regional wealth within EU 
 
In terms of the per person economic wealth, as in GDP per head, if we were to rank all EU 
regions from wealthiest to poorest and put them into four equal groups, with group 1 being 
the wealthiest group and 4 the poorest group, which of the 4 groups do you believe your 
region is in today?”  
a. Group 1 (In the wealthiest 25% of EU regions), b. Group 2, c. Group 3, d. Group 4 (The 
poorest 25% of EU regions) 
 
Attitudes on redistribution 
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(COUNTRY’s) national government should take measures to reduce differences in income 
levels among people in (COUNTRY) (0- fully disagree – 10 fully agree) 
 
Gal Tan 
 
1. (COUNTRY) should have more restrictions on immigration than it does today (0- fully 
disagree – 10 fully agree) 
 
2. (COUNTRY) should have a strong leader that can solve problems quickly, who does not 
have to worry about elections and parliamentary rules. (0- fully disagree – 10 fully agree) 
 
3. People have many different opinions about what ‘being European’ means.  On a scale from 
0-10, where ‘0’ means “not at all important” and ‘10’ means “very important”, how important 
are the following for you in terms of ‘being European’?  
c. The Christian religion 
 
economic satisfaction 
 
“How satisfied are you with the current economic situation in your region today?”  
(1-4, very satisfied – very unsatisfied) 
 
 
Party support (vote EU skeptic) 
 
Turning a bit to politics, what political party would you vote for if the national parliamentary 
election were tomorrow? (provide current party list by country),  
 
=1 if party listed belongs to Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF), Europe of 
Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD), or the European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group (ECR), or is otherwise explicitly Euroskeptic.  
 
 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics of variables 
 
Variable Mean mean st. dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
     supportCP (1-4) 
   
0 1 
strongly agree 17,147 .272 .445 0 1 
 agree 17,147 .526 .499 0 1 
disagree 17,147 .144 .351 0 1 
strongly disagree 17,147 .046 .207 0 1 
d/k 17,147 .012 .112 0 1 
intensity support (1-3) 
     positive intensity (spend more) 17,147 .159 .366 0 1 
the same 17,147 .598 .490 0 1 
negative intensity (spend less) 17,147 .242 .428 0 1 
Independent variables 
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National corr. Perceptions 17,147 .691 .264 0 1 
EU corr. Perceptions 17,147 .628 .249 0 1 
gender (female) 17,147 .505 .499 0 1 
Age (1-4) 17,147 2.580 1.024 1 4 
University (or higher) 17,147 .431 .495 0 1 
National ID 17,147 .239 .426 0 1 
prefer redistribution 17,147 .774 .257 0 1 
Gal_tan 17,147 .588 .247 0 1 
vote EU skeptic party 17,168 .114 .317 0 1 
perception of region 17,147 2.714 .999 1 4 
Economic sat. 17,147 2.496 .839 1 4 
EQI (2013) 17,165 
-
.0353547 .949 -2.59795 1.637 
Struc. Funds per cap. (log 2007-13) 17,167 -2.32e-07 1 
-
2.076759 1.452 
 
 
Note: unweighted means and proportions reported.  Age is in 4 categories – 18-29, 30-44. 45-59 and 60+ 
 
Table A3: Country level variation in Dependent Variables 
COUNTRY  
Support CP (agree 
+ strongly agree) 
Strongly 
Support CP 
Positive 
Intensity: 
Spend More 
Negative 
Intensity: 
Spend Less 
Austria 0.73 0.17 0.21 0.16 
Bulgaria 0.78 0.37 0.11 0.26 
Estonia 0.73 0.28 0.06 0.26 
France 0.72 0.24 0.14 0.33 
Germany 0.79 0.27 0.26 0.15 
Hungary 0.85 0.29 0.09 0.27 
Italy 0.75 0.15 0.15 0.31 
Latvia 0.75 0.32 0.14 0.35 
Netherlands 0.67 0.11 0.05 0.39 
Poland 0.85 0.33 0.08 0.20 
Romania 0.89 0.35 0.36 0.06 
Slovakia 0.91 0.25 0.08 0.25 
Spain 0.89 0.38 0.24 0.17 
Sweden 0.78 0.28 0.08 0.29 
UK 0.73 0.26 0.15 0.34 
Weighted sample ave. 0.79 0.27 0.18 0.24 
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Table A4: Regional Institutional Quality and Gap in National and EU Corruption 
Perceptions 
 
variable Beta 
female 0.005 
 
(0.97) 
age -0.014*** 
 
(-6.14) 
university 0.007 
 
(1.05) 
Natioanl identity -0.039*** 
 
(-5.34) 
Prefer redistribution 0.065*** 
 
(5.46) 
Gal-tan -0.147*** 
 
(-8.03) 
Vote Euroskeptic party -0.001 
 
(-0.10) 
Perceived regional wealth 0.007* 
 
(2.14) 
Satisfcation with economy -0.008 
 
(-1.79) 
Structural Funds received 0.002 
 
(0.21) 
EQI -0.085*** 
 
(-7.18) 
constant 0.137*** 
 
(7.18) 
random effects 
 Regional level -0.078*** 
standard error 0.005 
  individual level residual 0.250*** 
standard error 0.004 
Note: estimates from multilevel model, with random regional level intercepts.  The dependent variable is the 
difference between national and EU level corruption perceptions, ranging from -1 to 1, whereby positive 
(negative) numbers imply that the respondent perceives higher (lower) corruption at the national level compared 
with the EU.  T-scores in parentheses.  Total number of observations = 17,125. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *0.05 
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Table A5: Alternative measure of institutional quality - Corruption Risk Index (CRI) 
 
   
  
variable     
Support CP 
Strongly 
support 
Spend more Spend less 
Ologit: 
Support 
Ologit: 
Intensity 
Nat. Corr. perceptions 0.20* 0.19** 0.62*** -0.19* 0.17*** -0.30*** 
   
(0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) 
EU corr. Perceptions -1.26*** -0.67*** -0.39*** -1.47*** -0.91*** -0.95*** 
   
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) 
CRI 
  
0.24*** 0.13* 0.09 0.03 0.18*** -0.03 
   
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
Nat Corr*CRI 
 
-0.31*** -0.20** -0.16 0.03 -0.25*** -0.07 
   
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
constant 
 1.53 (0.18) 
1.04 (0.17) 1.62 (0.20) 1.92  (0.08) 0.40 (0.09) 1.65 (0.14) 
 
    
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
Country fixed effects 
 
yes yes Yes no yes no 
model chi2 (p vlaue) 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations  
 
17,075 17,075 17,075 17,147  17,147 17,075 
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Table A6: Test of confounding effects of government support on Support for Cohesion 
 
      (1)   (2)   (3) 
    H1: main   H2:  interaction   3-way interaction 
EU corruption perceptions -0.956*** -0.946*** -0.950*** 
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) 
NAT corruption perceptions 0.143* 0.154* 0.125 
  (0.084) (0.084) (0.099) 
EQI -0.097** 0.069 0.153* 
  (0.049) (0.076) (0.090) 
Government party support 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.065 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.102) 
female -0.075** -0.075** -0.076** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
age 0.013 0.013 0.013 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
university 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
National id. -0.231*** -0.234*** -0.234*** 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Prefer redistribution 0.886*** 0.884*** 0.883*** 
  (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Gal_tan -1.082*** -1.078*** -1.078*** 
  (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
voteEUskeptic -0.529*** -0.531*** -0.508*** 
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) 
Regional self-placement -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Economic sat. 0.153*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Structural Funds (2007-13) 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Nat. corr. * EQI  -0.224*** -0.304*** 
   (0.080) (0.100) 
     
Gov party* Nat. corr   0.087 
    (0.147) 
     
Gov. party * EQI   -0.177* 
    (0.104) 
    
Gove. Party * nat. corr. * EQI   0.163 
   (0.144) 
     
/cut1 -3.257*** -3.223*** -3.233*** 
  (0.149) (0.149) (0.155) 
/cut2 -1.572*** -1.538*** -1.548*** 
  (0.144) (0.144) (0.149) 
/cut3 1.075*** 1.110*** 1.101*** 
  (0.143) (0.144) (0.149) 
Obs. 16927 16927 16927 
Pseudo R-squared  0.051 0.052 0.052 
 
Note: dependent variable is Support, scaled 1-4. Ordered logit estimate with country fixed effects and 
design weights included. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Government party support is ‘1’ if the 
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respondent selected a party in the current sitting government during the summer of 2017 to the 
question ‘what political party would you vote for if the national elections were held tomorrow?’ and ‘0’ if 
otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table A7: Test of confounding effects of government support on Intensity for Cohesion 
   (1)   (2)   (3) 
    H1: main   H2:   interaction   3-way interaction 
EU corruption perceptions -0.949*** -0.940*** -0.937*** 
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
NAT corruption perceptions 0.303*** 0.312*** 0.188* 
  (0.083) (0.082) (0.098) 
EQI -0.008 0.124 0.159* 
  (0.054) (0.082) (0.095) 
Government party support 0.026 0.027 -0.188* 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.099) 
female -0.031 -0.030 -0.031 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
age -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
university 0.055* 0.053 0.053 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
National id. -0.191*** -0.193*** -0.194*** 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Prefer redistribution 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.253*** 
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Gal_tan -1.041*** -1.038*** -1.043*** 
  (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
voteEUskeptic -0.552*** -0.554*** -0.542*** 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) 
Regional self-placement -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.065*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Economic sat. 0.170*** 0.172*** 0.170*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Structural Funds (2007-13) 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
  (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) 
Nat. corr. * EQI  -0.177** -0.237** 
   (0.084) (0.103) 
    
Gov party* Nat. corr   0.353** 
    (0.146) 
     
Gov. party * EQI   -0.071 
    (0.107) 
     
Gove. Party * nat. corr. * EQI   0.141 
    (0.149) 
 
/cut1 -1.643*** -1.616*** -1.703*** 
  (0.147) (0.147) (0.152) 
/cut2 1.443*** 1.470*** 1.384*** 
  (0.147) (0.147) (0.152) 
Obs. 17147 17147 17147 
Pseudo R-squared  0.062 0.062 0.062 
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Note: dependent variable is Intensity, scaled 1-3. Ordered logit estimate with country fixed effects and design 
weights included.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Government party support is ‘1’ if the respondent selected a 
party in the current sitting government during the summer of 2017 to the question ‘what political party would you 
vote for if the national elections were held tomorrow?’ and ‘0’ if otherwise.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A8: Testing Explained variation by key variables - OLS Estimates for Support for Cohesion Policy 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
    Fixed effects 
only   
  Corruption 
perceptions 
  EQI   Interaction   With full 
controls 
Nat. corr. perceptions  0.056  0.059 0.039 
   (0.037)  (0.037) (0.037) 
eqi13   -0.033 0.034 0.033 
    (0.021) (0.034) (0.034) 
interaction    -0.088** -0.089** 
     (0.038) (0.037) 
       
constant 2.875*** 3.148*** 2.896*** 3.159*** 3.002*** 
  (0.023) (0.033) (0.027) (0.036) (0.063) 
Obs. 16905 16905 16905 16905 16905 
R-squared  0.044 0.065 0.046 0.068 0.108 
 
Note: The dependent variable is ‘support’, ranging from 1-4. OLS estimates are used to show the stepwise 
variation explained in the dependent variable.  All models include country fixed effects and design weights.  
Models 2, 4 and 5 include perceptions of EU corruption so as to avoid reporting biased results for national 
corruption. Model 5 includes all control variables. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
 
Table A8: Testing Explained variation by key variables - OLS Estimates for Intensity for Cohesion Policy 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
    Fixed effects 
only   
  Corruption 
perceptions 
  EQI Interactio
n 
  With full 
controls 
Nat. corr. perceptions  0.076***  0.077*** 0.074** 
   (0.029)  (0.029) (0.029) 
eqi13   0.006 0.045 0.044 
    (0.019) (0.029) (0.029) 
interaction    -0.052* -0.057* 
     (0.032) (0.031) 
constant 1.806*** 1.976*** 1.803*** 1.967*** 2.018*** 
  (0.017) (0.026) (0.021) (0.028) (0.051) 
Obs. 17125 17125 17125 17125 17125 
R-squared  0.059 0.074 0.060 0.075 0.100 
 
Note: The dependent variable is ‘intensity’, ranging from 1-3. OLS estimates are used to show the 
stepwise variation explained in the dependent variable.  All models include country fixed effects and 
design weights.  Models 2, 4 and 5 include perceptions of EU corruption so as to avoid reporting biased 
results for national corruption. Model 5 includes all control variables. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1: Corruption Perceptions and Support for Cohesion Policy: Logit Estimates 
 
Note: dots are average marginal effect on the probability of the DV with 95% confidence intervals.  Constant and country 
fixed effects not shown.  Reference category for gender is ‘male’.   
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Figure A2: Corruption and Intensity of Support for CP – Logit Estimates 
 
Note: dots are average marginal effect on the probability of the DV with 95% confidence intervals.  Constant and country 
fixed effects not shown.  
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Figure A3: 3 level hierarchical models with Bootstrapped standard errors 
 
Note: dots are average marginal effect on the probability of the DV with 95% confidence intervals.  Constant 
and country fixed effects not shown.  Standard errors drawn from clustered bootstrapped method (simple 
random sample with replacement, 150 replicates) with the reginal level selected. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix chapter 3 
Appendix:  
Table A1: Summary Statistics (orginal scales) 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
individual level 
     
Support EU Bailouts 28,796 2.45 0.95 1 4 
binary support bailouts 28,796 0.53 0.5 0 1 
Female 30,064 1.55 0.5 1 2 
Population 30,042 1.94 0.78 1 3 
Age 30,064 4.04 1.65 1 6 
income 30,064 0.6 0.49 0 1 
education 29,511 2.27 0.81 1 4 
unemployed 30,064 0.09 0.29 0 1 
economic sat. 29,449 3.21 1.01 1 5 
Gal_Tan 26,667 5.91 2.06 1 11 
Left right (self-placement) 24,388 3.04 1.32 1 5 
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Vote_EU skeptic 30,064 0.07 0.26 0 1 
EU integration (oppose) 28,225 7.8 2.98 1 11 
 
regional level      
EQI  30,064 0.108 0.99 -2.598 1.761 
PPP p.c.  24,071 23840.96 9237.015 7200 5560 
Income inequality  22,933 15.59 6.065 4.9 38.4 
Corruption risk (% single 
bids) 
22,932 0.172 0.135 0 0.69 
 
national level  
     control of corruption (WGI) 30,064 0.958 0.814 -0.3 2.261 
PPP p.c.  30,064 34414.9 12077.9 16323 91047 
Debt/GDP 30,064 74.08 36.588 10.4 180.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EES survey questions used in the analysis 
-Income – ‘during the last 12 months, would you say you’ve had difficulty to pay your bills on time? (1=most of 
the time, 2=from time to time, 3= never, almost never) (d60) 
-Education: year at which you stopped school 15 or less, 16-19, >19, still student 
-Social class – self id: low, middle, high 
-economic satisfaction (What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that 
the general economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY), 1-5, a lot better – a lot worse) 
 
-unemployed: 0/1 
-Traditional economic left-right index: (3 questions, combined with factor weights) 
-state versus market (0-10 scale) 0 You are fully in favour of state intervention in the economy, 10 You 
are fully opposed to state intervention in the economy 
 
-Support for income redistribution within own country (0-10 scale) 0 = You are fully in favour of the 
redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in (OUR COUNTRY), 10 = you are fully opposed 
 
-public spending (0-10 scale) 0 You are fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services, 10 
You are fully in favour of cutting public services to cut taxes 
 
-Gal-tan measure (three questions, combined with factor weights) 
 
-same-sex marriage (0-10 scale) 0 You are fully in favour of same-sex marriage, 10 You are fully 
opposed to same-sex marriage 
 
-civil liberties  (0-10 scale)  0 You fully support privacy rights even if they hinder efforts to combat 
crime, 10 You are fully in favour of restricting privacy rights in order to combat crime 
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-environment  (0-10 scale) – 0 Environmental protection should always take priority even at the cost o 
economic growth, 10 Economic growth should always take priority even at the cost of environmental 
protection 
-Vote anti-EU party if next national election were today (EU skeptic party= 1, 0=if otherwise) (QPP5).  
Coded ‘1’ if party belongs to a Eurosceptic bloc in EU parliament, 0 if otherwise. 
 
-Left-right self-placement:  In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". What is your 
position? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means "left" and '10' means "right". Which number 
best describes your position? (0-10) (QPP13) 
 
-Political interest – you are very interested in politics (1=yes totally, 4=not at all) 
 
-Views on immigration (0-10), 0= you are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration, 10= you are 
fully opposed  
 
-Trust in EU – you trust the institutions of the EU (1=yes totally, 4=not at all) (QP6_2) 
 
 
-European identity: ‘you feel attached to Europe (1=yes totally, 4=not at all)  
 
-National identity: ‘you feel attached to (your country) (1=yes totally, 4=not at all)  
 
 
-Support for EU integration (‘moreEU’)  - Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others 
say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 
10, where '0' means unification "has already gone too far" and '10' means it "should be pushed further". 
What number on this scale best describes your position? (0-10), 0=EU unification has gone too far, 10= 
EU unification should be pushed further (QPP18) 
 
-Gender (female=1, male=0)  
 
-Age – 6 categories: 18-24, 25-34. 35-44. 45-54, 55-64, 65+ 
 
-population – rural, town, large town/urban 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Robustness checks – Alternative measure of regional corruption 
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variable 
1. Macro-level 
factors – logit 
estimation 
2. Logit 
estimation full 
model 
  
3. ordered 
logit 
estimation 
Corruption Risk (% single bid) 1.20*** 0.87***  -0.67*** 
 
(0.28) (0.24)  (0.23) 
Regional GDP p.c. 0.80* 0.48  0.66* 
 
(0.47) (0.41)  (0.38) 
Regional Inequality -0.17 0.16  0.07 
 
(0.33) (0.29)  (0.28) 
female 
 
-0.07*  -0.09*** 
  
(0.03)  (0.03) 
age 
 
0.21***  0.28*** 
  
(0.06)  (0.05) 
income 
 
0.28***  0.23*** 
  
(0.04)  (0.04) 
education 
 
0.99***  0.98*** 
  
(0.10)  (0.08) 
unemployed 
 
-0.06  -0.07 
  
(0.07)  (0.06) 
economic sat. 
 
1.47***  1.40*** 
  
(0.08)  (0.07) 
Gal_Tan 
 
-1.18***  -1.21*** 
  
(0.10)  (0.09) 
Far-left 
 
0.22***  0.22*** 
  
(0.06)  (0.05) 
Center-Left 
 
0.26***  0.23*** 
  
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Center right 
 
0.14***  0.10*** 
  
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Far right 
 
0.09*  0.05 
  
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Vote EU Skeptic 
 
-0.64**  -0.62*** 
  
(0.06)  (0.05) 
EU integration (oppose) -1.11***  -1.17*** 
  
(0.06)  (0.06) 
Constant 0.14 0.18 
  
 
(0.28) (0.27) 
  
cut 1 
 
  -1.71 (0.25) 
cut 2 
 
  -0.20 (0.25) 
cut 3 
 
  2.31 (0.25) 
  
 
  
Random intercept (var) 0.32 (0.04) 0.20 (0.03)  0.19 (0.03) 
Model Chi2 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Observations (regions) 21,933 (174) 16,580 (173)   
16,580 
(173)  
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Note: hierarchical estimation with standard errors in parentheses.  Models 1 and 2 are estimated with a binary 
dependent variable and logit hierarchical logit regression, while model 3 uses the four point scale on the 
dependent variable and employs hierarchical ordered logit.   Models have fewer observations due to the single 
bidder corruption measure being available for countries with multiple NUTS 2 regions.  Estonia, Latvia, Malta, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg and Cyprus not included.  All variables re-scaled between 0-1 for purposes of 
comparison.   ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Country level of Corruption and Support for EU Bailouts 
 
Note: variable is scaled 1-4, with ‘1’ being ‘totally disagree’ and ‘4’ being ‘totally agree’.  Scatterplot calculated 
using survey design weights.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Hierarchical Estimates with Country Level Variable and Random Effects 
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variable 
 
1. Macro-level 
factors – logit 
estimation 
2. Logit 
estimation 
full model 
 3. ordered logit 
estimation 
Control of corruption (WGI) 0.94*** 0.58* 1.01*** 
  
(0.37) (0.36) (0.10) 
Country GDP p.c. 
 
0.60 0.52 -0.77** 
  
(0.62) (0.60) (0.23) 
Debt/GDP 
 
-0.54 -0.36 -0.02 
  
(0.36) (0.35) (0.08) 
female 
 
 
-0.07** -0.12*** 
  
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
age 
 
 
0.23*** 0.24*** 
  
 
(0.05) (0.04) 
income 
 
 
0.19*** 0.15*** 
  
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
education 
  
0.87*** 0.93*** 
   
(0.08) (0.07) 
unemployed 
 
-0.05 -0.06 
   
(0.05) (0.05) 
economic sat. 
 
1.32*** 1.18*** 
   
(0.07) (0.06) 
Gal_Tan 
 
-1.11*** -1.11*** 
   
(0.09) (0.07) 
Far left 
  
0.25*** 0.23*** 
   
(0.05) (0.04) 
Center left 
 
0.27*** 0.23*** 
   
(0.05) (0.04) 
Center right 
 
0.20*** 0.15*** 
   
(0.05) (0.04) 
Far right 
  
0.23*** 0.19*** 
   
(0.05) (0.04) 
Vote EU Skeptic 
  
-0.61*** -0.60** 
   
(0.06) (0.05) 
EU integration (oppose) 
 
-0.96*** -1.00*** 
   
(0.05) (0.05) 
constant 0.07 
 
  
 
(0.22) 
 
Cut 1 
  
 
-1.42 (0.08) 
Cut 2 
Cut 3 
 
   
-0.01 (0.08) 
    2.35 (0.09) 
Random intercept (var) 
 
0.17 (0.04) 0.15 (0.04) 0.16 (0.14) 
Model Chi2 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations (countries) 
 
28,796 (28) 20,987 (28) 20,987 (28) 
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Table A4: LPM estimates from regional and national clustered standard errors and 
design weights 
  
variable 
 
1. regional level 
clustering 
  
2. country level 
clustering 
Institutional quality 
 
0.20***  0.28*** 
 
 
(0.07)  (0.06) 
Regional GDP p.c. 
 
0.0004  -0.29 
 
 
(0.12)  (0.18) 
Regional Inequality 
 
0.07   
 
 
(0.13)   
Debt/GDP 
 
  -0.07 
  
  (0.08) 
Constant 
 
0.32*** 
 
0.48*** 
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.06) 
  
 
  
  
   
Model R2 
 
0.14  0.15 
Observations (regions) 
 
20,662 (182)   20,987 (28)  
 
Note: estimates from linear probability models accounting for survey design weights (clustered standard errors in 
parentheses).  Both models contain full battery of individual level controls.  Model 1 contains regional level 
macro variables and clustered standard errors, while model 2 contains country level ones.   
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Table A5: Binary and Ordered Logit Estimates 
 
 
EU 15 only   
 
NMS only   NMS only (no Romania) 
variable binary logit ordered logit 
 
binary logit 
ordered 
logit 
binary logit 
ordered 
logit 
Regional Institutional quality 
(EQI) 
1.65*** 1.52*** 
 
-0.60 0.06 
0.41 0.77* 
 
(0.32) (0.27) 
 
(0.56) (0.39) (0.65) (0.43) 
Regional GDP p.c. 1.02** 1.32** 
 
2.29** 1.37 2.44** 1.99** 
 
(0.46) (0.40) 
 
(1.08) (0.85) (1.09) (0.87) 
Regional Inequality 0.71* 0.52 
 
2.07*** 0.88* 2.26*** 1.26** 
 
(0.38) (0.33) 
 
(0.77) (0.49) (0.84) (0.50) 
Female -0.15*** -0.17*** 
 
0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 
 
(0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Age 0.16** 0.27** 
 
0.32*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 
 
(0.07) (0.06) 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) 
Income 0.29*** 0.26*** 
 
0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 
 
(0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
education 0.98*** 1.01*** 
 
0.64*** 0.64*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 
 
(0.11) (0.09) 
 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
unemployed -0.11 -0.12* 
 
0.01 0.08 0.03 0.09 
 
(0.08) (0.07) 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
economic sat. 1.45*** 1.33*** 
 
1.19*** 1.20*** 1.18*** 1.23*** 
 
(0.09) (0.08) 
 
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) 
Gal_Tan -1.24*** -1.25*** 
 
-0.73*** -0.73*** -0.73*** -0.72*** 
 
(0.12) (0.10) 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) 
Far-left 0.28*** 0.30*** 
 
0.10 0.01 0.10 -0.01 
 
(0.07) (0.06) 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Center-Left 0.26*** 0.22*** 
 
0.17** 0.16** 0.21** 0.20*** 
 
(0.06) (0.05) 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Center right 0.11* 0.05 
 
0.32*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 
 
(0.06) (0.05) 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Far right -0.07 -0.10* 
 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.48*** 0.45*** 
 
(0.07) (0.06) 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Vote EU Skeptic -0.81*** -0.76*** 
 
-0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 
 
(0.07) (0.06) 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
EU integration (oppose) -1.38*** -1.37*** 
 
-0.40*** -0.52*** -0.39*** -0.53*** 
 
(0.08) (0.07) 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant -1.29*** 
  
-1.52** 
 
-2.19** 
 
 
(0.36) 
  
(0.60) 
 
(0.65) 
 
cut 1 
 
-0.40 (0.31) 
  
-0.36 
(0.44) 
 
0.34 (0.47) 
cut 2 
 
1.10 (0.31) 
  
1.13 (0.44) 
 
1.85 (0.47) 
cut 3 
 
3.68 (0.32) 
  
3.44 (0.44) 
 
4.21 (0.47) 
 
       Random intercept (var) 0.15 (0.03) 0.12 (0.02) 
 
0.24 (0.06) 0.33 (0.08) 0.22 (0.06) 0.30 (0.08) 
Model Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Observations (regions) 12,643 (130) 12,643 (130) 
 
8,019 (52) 8,019 (52) 7,477 (44) 7,477 (44) 
 
 
Note: models in columns 1 and 2 include only respondents from EU15 countries, and 3-6 include only those in 
the new Member States (NMS).  In columns 5 and 6 the models are re-run without Romania, which was an 
outlying country in the models.  Each sub-sample is analyzed with the binary and ordered dependent variable.   
 
 
 
Table A6: Country-wise jackknife  
 
 
   country removed EQI obs (regions) 
Austria 0.85 (0.24) 19,860 (173) 
Belgium 0.86 (0.24) 19,708 (179) 
Bulgaria 0.86 (0.25) 20,046 (176) 
Croatia 0.95 (0.22) 19,956 (180) 
Cyprus 0.84 (0.24) 20,662 (182) 
Czech Republic 0.79 (0.25) 19,790 (174) 
Denmark 0.84 (0.25) 19,712 (177) 
Estonia 0.85 (0.24) 20,022 (181) 
Finland 0.87 (0.25) 19,772 (178) 
France 0.80 (0.25) 19,898 (161) 
Germany 0.80 (0.25) 19,379 (166) 
Greece 0.82 (0.24) 19,816 (178) 
Hungary 0.85 (0.24) 19,838 (179) 
Ireland 0.83 (0.24) 19,911 (180) 
Italy 0.49 (0.25) 19,987 (166) 
Latvia 0.85 (0.24) 19,979 (181) 
Lithuania 0.85 (0.24) 19,995 (181) 
Luxembourg 0.87 (0.24) 20,272 (181) 
Malta 0.83 (0.24) 20,411 (181) 
Netherlands 0.85 (0.25) 19,679 (170) 
Poland 0.91 (0.24) 19,970 (166) 
Portugal 0.87 (0.24) 20,029 (177) 
Romania 1.17 (0.24) 20,120 (174) 
Slovakia 0.70 (0.24) 19,838 (178) 
Slovenia 0.80 (0.24) 19,960 (181) 
Spain 0.90 (0.23) 19,815 (165) 
Sweden 0.71 (0.23) 19,651 (179) 
United Kingdom 0.80 (0.25) 19,798 (170) 
 
Note: Table summarizes results of 28 hierarchical logit model estimates from (see model 3 in 
Table 1 for full specifications).  Countries removed one at a time to test for the effects of 
outliers influential observations.  All models include full set of control variables; only effect 
of EQI reported for sake of space.  Original model: beta= 0.84, s.e. 0.24. 
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Appendix chapter 4: identity and cohesion policy 
Further background information on the survey 
See appendix chapter 2 above 
 
Table A1: Sample information 
See appendix chapter 2 above 
 
 
Alternative formulations of European Identity Questions: 
 
A slight variation on this main question is sometimes phrased:  
 
‘As well as your current citizenship, do you also think of yourself as a citizen of the European 
Union/(COUNTRY)? a) Often; b) Sometimes; c) Never.  
 
Whereby a respondent is coded as having ‘exclusive national identity’ is one who answers 
‘never’ to Europe’ and something other than ‘never’ to one’s nation. 
 
 
Survey questions used in analysis (see main text for dependent and other key 
independent variables) 
 
 
Strength of identity 
 
‘On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being ‘I don’t identify at all, and ‘10’ being ‘I identify very 
strongly’, how strongly you identify yourself with the following?’:  
a. your region, b. your country, c. Europe 
 
perceptions of one’s relative regional wealth within EU 
 
In terms of the per person economic wealth, as in GDP per head, if we were to rank all EU 
regions from wealthiest to poorest and put them into four equal groups, with group 1 being 
the wealthiest group and 4 the poorest group, which of the 4 groups do you believe your 
region is in today?”  
a. Group 1 (In the wealthiest 25% of EU regions), b. Group 2, c. Group 3, d. Group 4 (The 
poorest 25% of EU regions) 
 
Attitudes on domestic redistribution 
 
(COUNTRY’s) national government should take measures to reduce differences in income 
levels among people in (COUNTRY) (0- fully disagree – 10 fully agree) 
 
Gal Tan 
 
1. (COUNTRY) should have more restrictions on immigration than it does today (0- fully 
disagree – 10 fully agree) 
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2. (COUNTRY) should have a strong leader that can solve problems quickly, who does not 
have to worry about elections and parliamentary rules. (0- fully disagree – 10 fully agree) 
 
 
economic satisfaction 
 
“How satisfied are you with the current economic situation in your region today?”  
(1-4, very satisfied – very unsatisfied) 
 
 
Party support (vote EU skeptic) 
 
Turning a bit to politics, what political party would you vote for if the national parliamentary 
election were tomorrow? (provide current party list by country),  
 
=1 if party listed belongs to Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF), Europe of 
Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD), or the European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group (ECR), or is otherwise explicitly Euroskeptic.  
 
 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
individual level 
      
 
Economic solidarity (DV) 17,147 1.917 0.628 1 3 
 
civic 17,147 0.646 0.242 0 1 
 
religious-civic (re-scaled) 17,147 0.453 0.203 0 1 
 
religious 17,147 0.553 0.361 0 1 
 
strength (Europe) 17,147 0.641 0.283 0 1 
 
strength (national) 17,147 0.747 0.252 0 1 
 
female 17,147 0.505 0.500 0 1 
 
Age4 17,147 0.645 0.256 0.25 1 
 
income (medium) 17,147 0.287 0.452 0 1 
 
income (high) 17,147 0.354 0.478 0 1 
 
income (d.k./ref) 17,147 0.074 0.262 0 1 
 
Urban 17,168 0.074 0.262 0 1 
 
unemployed 17,168 0.061 0.240 0 1 
 
econ. Sat. 17,147 0.624 0.210 0.25 1 
 
perceived reg. Wealth 17,147 0.572 0.250 0.25 1 
 
support dom. Redistribution 17,147 0.774 0.257 0 1 
 
restrict immigration 17,147 0.591 0.345 0 1 
 
strong leader 17,147 0.618 0.365 0 1 
 
vote EU skeptic 17,168 0.114 0.317 0 1 
 
social trust 17,147 0.622 0.241 0 1 
regional level 
      
 
EQI 2013 17,165 -0.035 0.948 -2.598 1.636 
 
Struc. Funds (2007-13, logged) 17,167 -2.32E-07 1 -2.077 1.452 
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Table A3: full results of Figure 4 – Test of H1 
 
      (1)   (2) 
      basline With 
controls 
Religious-civic -1.386*** -0.950*** 
  (0.106) (0.112) 
Strength 1.340*** 1.202*** 
  (0.078) (0.082) 
female  -0.061 
   (0.038) 
Age  -0.323*** 
   (0.078) 
Income: medium  -0.163*** 
   (0.054) 
Income: high  -0.208*** 
   (0.051) 
income4 (d/k)  -0.234*** 
   (0.079) 
Urban  0.051 
   (0.071) 
unemployed  0.022 
   (0.099) 
Econ. Sat.  0.540*** 
   (0.113) 
Perceived reg. wealth  0.163 
   (0.102) 
support_redist  0.202** 
   (0.082) 
restrict_imm  -0.787*** 
   (0.065) 
strong_leader  -0.111* 
   (0.061) 
voteEUskeptic  -0.338*** 
   (0.071) 
Social trust  0.105 
   (0.094) 
EQI  0.068 
   (0.070) 
Structural Funds 2007-13  0.042 
   (0.044) 
/cut1 -0.578*** -0.819*** 
  (0.085) (0.164) 
/cut2 2.252*** 2.343*** 
  (0.092) (0.168) 
Obs. 17125 17125 
Pr chi2  0.0000 0.0000 
 
Estimates are logged odds from ordered logit.  Standard errors 
are in parenthesis. Country fixed effects and survey design 
weights included (not shown) 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table A4: Test of Type of European identity and Strength of Identity (belonging to 
community mechanism) 
      (1)   (2) 
      National 
strength 
  European 
strength 
Religious-civic 0.156*** -0.298*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) 
Strength European 0.386***  
  (0.010)  
female -0.010** 0.019*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 0.058*** 0.041*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) 
Income: medium 0.009* -0.004 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Income: high 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
income4 (d/k) -0.023** -0.008 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
Urban 0.000 0.022*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
unemployed -0.017* -0.003 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
Econ. Sat. 0.045*** 0.083*** 
  (0.012) (0.013) 
Perceived reg. wealth 0.046*** 0.037*** 
  (0.011) (0.012) 
support_redist 0.015 0.012 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
restrict_imm 0.069*** -0.076*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
strong_leader -0.003 -0.023*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
voteEUskeptic 0.012 -0.056*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) 
Social trust 0.096*** 0.109*** 
  (0.011) (0.012) 
EQI 0.009 -0.038*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Structural Funds 2007-
13 
0.026*** -0.007 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
nat_strength  0.451*** 
   (0.011) 
_cons 0.249*** 0.258*** 
  (0.017) (0.019) 
Obs. 17125 17125 
R-squared  0.277 0.321 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Heckman selection models: 
 
Heckman models are use to estimate several models in Tables A5 and A7, as those that were 
asked certain follow up questions in the survey only did so due to their response on the 
original dependent variable.  The first stage of the model is a probit equation that serves as a 
selection of having expressed ‘spending ‘less’ or not (e.g. ‘more/same’).  The second stage is 
the equation of the effects of our independent variables on each of the perception of others’ 
free riding’.  The model assumes that the error terms of these two models are related and will 
lead to bias if not accounted for.  The estimation essentially provides a test of this assumption 
with the parameter 𝜌, which gives us the correlation between the error terms of the two stages 
of the Heckman model – if 𝜌 is in fact significant, the two-stage model is appropriate, 
meaning standard OLS would be biased. 
 
Table A5: Test of free rider mechanism 
 
      (1)   (2)   (3) 
     1
st
 stage: Spend 
less 
 2
nd
 stage: free 
rider 
  OLS: free rider 
Strength European -0.771*** -0.645* -0.569*** 
  (0.043) (0.375) (0.150) 
Religious-civic 0.813*** 0.884** 0.814*** 
  (0.063) (0.426) (0.223) 
female 0.011 -0.143* -0.155* 
  (0.023) (0.086) (0.086) 
Age 0.057 0.086 0.201 
  (0.045) (0.176) (0.175) 
Income: medium 0.024 0.021 0.054 
  (0.030) (0.112) (0.110) 
Income: high 0.015 -0.062 -0.010 
  (0.030) (0.115) (0.114) 
income4 (d/k) 0.051 0.019 0.070 
  (0.048) (0.180) (0.191) 
Urban 0.015 -0.141 -0.028 
  (0.047) (0.181) (0.164) 
unemployed 0.092** -0.016 0.068 
  (0.046) (0.170) (0.165) 
Econ. Sat. -0.553*** -0.293 -0.147 
  (0.061) (0.327) (0.219) 
Perceived reg. wealth -0.173*** -0.515** -0.732*** 
  (0.057) (0.229) (0.214) 
support_redist -0.077* 0.699*** 0.765*** 
  (0.046) (0.174) (0.169) 
restrict_imm 0.604*** 1.281*** 1.297*** 
  (0.037) (0.316) (0.138) 
strong_leader 0.176*** 0.800*** 0.862*** 
  (0.035) (0.153) (0.133) 
voteEUskeptic 0.261*** -0.300 -0.152 
  (0.036) (0.199) (0.170) 
Social trust -0.238*** 0.270** 0.358*** 
  (0.049) (0.128) (0.116) 
EQI -0.054 0.049 0.252*** 
  (0.036) (0.093) (0.093) 
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Structural Funds 2007-13 0.014   
  (0.027)   
_cons -0.295*** 5.351*** 5.394*** 
  (0.088) (0.700) (0.316) 
/mills 0.183 0.183  
  (0.623) (0.623)  
Obs. 17147 17147 4147 
R-squared    0.137 
 
Note: two-stage Heckman selection model estimates.  1
st
 stage is a probit model with the 
variable ‘national id’ as the excluded variable in the second stages.  Standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  Country fixed effects included (not shown).Standard errors are in 
parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table A6: Test of preferences for redistribution mechanism 
Support domestic 
redistribution 
 Coef.  St.Err  p-value  Sig. 
Strength European 0.062 0.074 0.401  
Religious-civic -0.603 0.110 0.000 *** 
female 0.103 0.035 0.003 *** 
Age 0.377 0.070 0.000 *** 
Income: medium 0.012 0.047 0.801  
Income: high -0.121 0.047 0.011 ** 
Income (d/k) -0.196 0.079 0.013 ** 
Urban 0.088 0.067 0.189  
unemployed 0.183 0.074 0.014 ** 
Econ. Sat. -1.348 0.101 0.000 *** 
Perceived reg. wealth -0.261 0.090 0.004 *** 
restrict_imm 0.425 0.063 0.000 *** 
strong_ledaer 0.921 0.063 0.000 *** 
voteEUskeptic -0.069 0.058 0.237  
soc_trust 0.348 0.087 0.000 *** 
EQI 0.235 0.054 0.000 *** 
Structural Funds 2007-13 0.102 0.037 0.007 *** 
cut1 -3.223 0.149   
cut2 -3.039 0.147   
cut3 -2.705 0.143   
cut4 -2.407 0.141   
cut5 -2.062 0.140   
cut6 -1.215 0.138   
cut7 -0.805 0.137   
cut8 -0.261 0.137   
cut9 0.464 0.136   
cut10 0.904 0.136   
 
Mean dependent var 0.774 SD dependent var  0.257 
Pseudo r-squared  0.039 Number of obs   17125.000 
Chi-square   1562.046 Prob > chi2  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 62264.341 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 62582.021 
 
 114 
Note: ordered logit estimates, logged odds reported.  Country fixed effects and survey design weights included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
 
Table A7: Test of perceived benefits among supporters of Cohesion policy 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
      1
st
 stage: 
spend more 
 2
nd
 stage: 
national 
interest 
  2
nd
 stage: EU 
interest 
  2
nd
 stage: 
transnational 
interest 
Strength European 0.333*** 0.982** 1.220*** 0.606 
  (0.048) (0.451) (0.390) (0.481) 
Religious-civic -0.282*** -0.253 -0.930** 0.123 
  (0.068) (0.438) (0.379) (0.469) 
female -0.069*** -0.078 -0.123 0.119 
  (0.024) (0.124) (0.107) (0.133) 
Age -0.106** -0.078 -0.137 0.575** 
  (0.048) (0.216) (0.187) (0.233) 
Income: medium -0.152*** -0.037 -0.080 0.126 
  (0.032) (0.219) (0.189) (0.234) 
Income: high -0.174*** -0.164 -0.144 -0.016 
  (0.032) (0.241) (0.208) (0.258) 
income4 (d/k) -0.275*** -0.208 -0.253 0.094 
  (0.054) (0.392) (0.339) (0.418) 
Urban 0.017 -0.287 -0.235 0.055 
  (0.047) (0.178) (0.154) (0.193) 
unemployed 0.090* 0.006 0.147 -0.054 
  (0.050) (0.219) (0.189) (0.236) 
Econ. Sat. -0.055 -0.238 -0.149 -0.061 
  (0.066) (0.257) (0.222) (0.277) 
Perceived reg. wealth -0.004 0.283 0.212 0.183 
  (0.061) (0.232) (0.201) (0.251) 
support_redist 0.214*** 1.357*** 1.432*** 1.278*** 
  (0.051) (0.328) (0.284) (0.351) 
restrict_imm -0.307*** -0.555 -0.545 -0.374 
  (0.038) (0.396) (0.342) (0.423) 
strong_leader 0.033 -0.234 -0.096 -0.194 
  (0.038) (0.151) (0.130) (0.163) 
Social trust -0.139*** 0.127 0.342 0.667** 
  (0.046) (0.307) (0.265) (0.330) 
EQI -0.206*** -0.314* -0.253* 0.106 
  (0.054) (0.169) (0.146) (0.182) 
Structural Funds 2007-13 -0.043 0.153 0.004 0.046 
 (0.039) (0.096) (0.083) (0.103) 
National id (0/1) -0.042    
  (0.030)    
constant -0.769*** 5.672*** 8.319*** 8.319*** 
  (0.098) (1.826) (2.246) (2.246) 
/mills 0.523 0.463 -1.699 -1.699 
  (1.514) (1.310) (1.610) (1.610) 
Obs. 17147 17147 17147 17147 
Pr(chi2)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Note: two-stage Heckman selection model estimates.  1
st
 stage is a probit model with the variable 
‘national id’ as the excluded variable in the second stages.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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Country fixed effects included (not shown). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
